This publication was made possible through support provided by the
Office of Agriculture and Food Security, Global Bureau, United States
Agency for International Development, under International Development
Grants No. DAN-1328-G-00-0046-00 and PCE-G-98-00036-00. The opinions expressed
herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the U.S. Agency for International Development.
PRESENTED TO THE SR/GL-CRSP PROJECT FOR IMPROVING PASTORAL RISK MANAGEMENT
ON EAST AFRICAN RANGELANDS
PREPARED BY JON R. MORIS
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Proper citation: Moris, J.R. 1998. Under Three Flags: The Policy Environments for Pastoralism in Ethiopia and Kenya. SR/GL-CRSP Pastoral Risk Management Project Technical Report No. 04/99. Utah State University, Logan. 119 pp.
Tables
1. Introduction
2. Comparing Ethiopia and Kenya
Similarities
Differences
3. Past Policies Towards Pastoralists
Differences
Similarities
4. National Policy Formulation and Documentation
5. Ethiopia and Kenya's Current Policies
6. Some Reflections about Ethiopia's and Kenya's Policies
7. Possible Consequences of Ethiopia's Unstated Policies
8. The Limits of Kenya's Technocratic Approach
9. Five Partially Successful Policy Initiatives
10. Unresolved Policy Issues
Major Unresolved Policy Issues
Some Implications
Appendices:
1. Themes for Analyzing the Policy Portfolio
3. Sources of Special Interest on East African Pastoral Development
4. Sources of Special Interest on African Agricultural Policy Choice
5. References
1. Policy Related Events in Kenya, 1978-98
2. Historical Events in Ethiopia, 1928-
3. Ethiopia's Third Livestock Project Achievements
4. Policies Affecting Ethiopia Food Security
This study focuses on understanding the evolving policy environment
for pastoralism in southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya. It is important
because donors put great stress upon policy analysis as the starting point
for addressing development issues, and because the pastoral environments
pose unusual difficulties to national policy-makers. Our approach involved
an in-depth review of documentation supplemented with interviews with decision
makers in Ethopia and Kenya during March to June of 1998. While the report
gives a detailed historical account (in chapter 3) of how policies towards
the pastoral sector were implemented in different decades, this summary
focuses on the lessons from the study for current policy-making.
Compared to highlanders, pastoral lowlanders in both countries have
been marginalized in terms of development. They occupy borderlands which
are often politically sensitive. Despite social and ecological stresses,
human population growth in the rangelands has been significant. During
the past 20 years a network of settlements has emerged based on continual
distribution of food relief and has contributed to a "desert urbanization
of the poor." General differences between the two countries: Both countries
have attempted (Kenya) or are attempting (Ethiopia) to transfer more power
of governance to local levels, but this has taken different forms-- Kenya
began with a "District-level focus" in 1984 and Ethiopia is now implementing
a federal system. The Kenya effort at decentralization has waned somewhat
over time, however, and most power is still found in Nairobi. Kenya has
an advantage over Ethiopia in that pastoralists in Kenya have been more
exposed to rural education-- in some cases for over 20 years-- and Kenyan
pastoralists appear more aware of the commercial economy. Ethiopia is more
pre-occupied with building schools and getting pastoralists to send their
children to school, while Kenya's problem appears more to be finding a
sustainable way to finance the existing educational operations and infrastructure
and getting better performance out of pastoral children who attend school.
More provision of pastoral services are provided by NGOs in Kenya compared
to that for Ethiopia. Kenya has encouraged and used NGOs to help capture
more external funding for development, while Ethiopia has recently been
more strict with NGOs and has compelled NGOs to conform and contribute
more to governmental priorities for development. In Kenya there is somewhat
less diversity in official languages used by government (i.e., Kiswahili,
English) compared to that for Ethiopia (i.e., Amhariña, Oromigña,
Tigrigña, English). Government in Ethiopia has been subjected to
huge upheavals and change during the past 30 years, while Kenya government
has been relatively stable, especially at the district level where continuity
has been maintained in some rural areas for up to 70 years.
In terms of past policy interventions, there are many similarities between
the two countries including: A commonly unsatisfactory experience with
technical interventions in pastoral regions, which has contributed to disillusionment
among pastoralists and agency personnel; overly optimistic development
projections by planners; and unhappy donors. From the 1950s to 1980s development
programs in both countries have commonly included grazing blocks, veterinary
campaigns, range planning, water development, marketing infrastructure
improvements, breeding ranches, and various forms of pastoral associations.
Ethiopia has continued with large-scale range projects under the auspices
of World Bank and African Development Bank financing, while Kenya has tended
to refrain from such continued involvements on a broad scale, except for
the Arid Lands Resource Management Project financed by World Bank. In the
1990s more typical interventions are localized, small-scale, and participatory
including drought mitigation, re-stocking, women's programs, improvement
of goats and camels, etc.
There is variation between Kenya and Ethiopia in the process of how
policies are forwarded, debated, processed, and approved. Major policies
in Ethiopia appear to be crafted in general and idealistic forms, while
those in Kenya appear to be more detailed and technocratic. In Ethiopia
policies appear to be used more for mobilizing a population that is still
trying to learn about policy implications. In Kenya, proclamations are
often highly specific about investment commitments to various sectors.
Investments may not always be delivered, but the Kenyan population appears
generally better informed and knowledgeable about policy implications.
Ethiopia at present is more sensitive to intrusion by donors or other outsiders
in debates over key policy issues, while in Kenya many draft policies and
background papers are viewed as not particularly sensitive and are even
prepared with donor assistance. Government structure in Ethiopia is dynamic
at state and federal levels-- given the massive changes in Ethiopia over
the past 30 years this is not surprising. Government structure in Kenya,
however, is relatively stable and even outlined in the Nairobi phone book.
Other features of Ethiopia include: A national early warning system is run by the federal Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC); agricultural field bureaus runs by the various states tend to be weak and have insufficient resources; NGOs are experimenting with local paravets, but drug supplies are a problem; the status of livestock marketing infrastructure is unclear-- some resources are in the process of privatization; revenue generation occurs through annual taxation at the household level as administered through peasant associations; pastoral lands are still held by the state, but can be leased to commercial operators; government allows pastoralists the freedom to own guns; bush encroachment is a threat to carrying capacity for range livestock, and privatization is an issue commonly manifested at a local level. Other features of Kenya include: District-based, early warning systems are coordinated from the Office of the President; the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development still carries out a reduced set of technical and participatory activities at the District level; NGOs are also experimenting with paravets; status of marketing infrastructure is unclear-- much has deterioriated and is no longer used; revenue generation solely by fees raised by County Councils on commercial activity; pastoral lands are still held by the state, with some group ranch legislation still in effect-- uncertainty for the future of land tenure in some areas prevails; government only officially condones that pastoralists have guns if they reside near an international border; bush encroachment is a threat to carrying capacity for range livestock; and privatization is an issue more at the national level.
The lengthy process of forming new policies in Ethiopia is caused by
several factors, and a "policy gap" can be problematic if it allows poorly
thought-out initiatives to be approved in the interim. The lack of policy
and relevant technical interventions is particularly evident for the rangelands
in Ethiopia. For example, a new move towards forced sedentarization of
pastoral populations or initiation of irrigation schemes may be poor choices
that could be pursued in the absence of a well thought-out policy framework.
In the absence of new policies, old policies of previous Ethiopian regimes
would remain as defacto rules and regulations, even if they are not appropriate
today. Despite a "policy gap" and a lack of operating resources, the federal
and state governments in Ethiopia appear committed to redressing problems
in the rangeland areas by virtue of their commitments to creating new development
agency offices in the south and paying attention to problems of infrastructure
and supporting institutions. Kenya's problem, in contrast to Ethiopia,
is a rather poor record of policy implementation in the rangelands despite
having more governmental stability and a generally greater access to operating
resources and well-trained agency manpower. The few larger range projects
that remain in Kenya may still not be making the most effective use of
a vast amount of technical information at their disposal. Problems with
banditry, infrastructural damage from El Niño, and a decline in
tourist revenues have recently hurt Kenya and have probably contributed
to more isolation and poverty stress in the northern rangelands. The once
impressive governmental services in the range sector still appear well-staffed,
but operating resources to make good use of trained manpower are increasingly
scarce.
Some issues that merit more attention as avenues for new initiatives in both southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya include consideration of how to sustain and strengthen local-level, decentralized development agencies, user associations for water supplies, other forms of grass-roots community mobilization, locally supported paravets, and alternative approaches to existing disaster early-warning systems. One fruitful area of applied research could involve study of how economic policies influence pastoral behavior at international borders, especially when those borders are like the one between southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya that bisects a functioning market space. How government can best achieve its goals and improve the welfare of locals with instruments such as exchange rates, duties, taxes, etc, could be illuminating.
Major unresolved policy issues for Ethiopia may include: (1) How to
improve food security in the lowlands; (2) how to mitigate resource degradation
in semi-arid range sites, especially in the form of bush encroachment;
(3) how to train and retain more talented personnel in the public sector,
and encourage more talent to reside in rural locations to better serve
the rural population; (4) how to engage more pastoralists in obtaining
formal education and making rural education sustainable; and (5) consider
other equitable forms of revenue generation for rangeland areas. For Kenya,
major unresolved policy issues may include: (1) Dealing with how to improved
the security of land claims, rural people, and rural commerce; (2) rehabilitation
of infrastructure; (3) reconsidering how formal education can best meet
changing needs of pastoralists; (4) how to limit and redress environmental
degradation and growing poverty associated with rangeland towns and settlements;
(5) how to retain talented public sector personnel, as above; and (6) consider
other forms of revenue generation, as above.
Readers interested in more details of summarized findings should see
the section on Unresolved Policy Issues. A table of contents follows.
ADB African Development Bank
ALDEV African Land Development Board schemes, colonial Kenya
ALRMP Arid Lands Resource Management Project, Kenya (World Bank)
AMC Agricultural Marketing Corporation, Ethiopia (Derg years)
ARDU Arsi Rural Development Unit, incorporating former CADU, Ethiopia
ASAL Arid and Semi-Arid Lands, Kenya
CADU Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit, Ethiopia
CBE Commercial Bank of Ethiopia
CBP Contagious bovine plauropneumonia
CGIAR Consultatative Group for International Agricultural Research
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CRSP Collaborative Research Support program, USAID
DIDPS District Integrated Development Programs, Kenya
DPIRP Drought Preparedness Interventions and Recovery Program, Kenya
DPPC Disaster Prevention & Preparedness Commission, Ethiopia
DRSRS Dept. of Resource Surveys and Remote Sensing, Kenya
DVO District Veterinary Officer
EDDC Ethiopian Domestic Distribution Corporation (Derg years)
EARO Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organization
ECU European Currency Unit
EEC European Economic Community
EFDR Ethiopian Federal Democratic Republic
EPA Ethiopian Privatization Agency
EPRDF Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU European Union
EWS Early Warning System
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FEWS Famine Early Warning System
FFW Food-for-work activities, linked to World Food Program
GDP Gross domestic product
GHAI Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, USAID
GOK Government of Kenya
GTZ Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit, German aid
IADP Integrated agricultural development program
IAR Institute of Agricultural Research, Ethiopia (now EARO)
IBRD International Bank for Reconstructions & Development (World Bank)
IDA International Development Association
IGADD Inter-governmental Authority on Drought & Development
ILCA International Livestock Center for Africa (now become ILRI)
ILRAD International Laboratory for Research in Animal Diseases (now ILRI)
ILRI International Livestock Research Institute
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPAL Integrated Project for Arid Lands, Marsabit, Kenya
IRDPS Integrated rural development programs
JEPSS Joint Ethiopian Pastoral Systems Study
JIRDU Jijiga Rangelands Development Unit, Ethiopia
KALRES Kenya Arid Lands Research Station, Marsabit (under KARI)
KANU Kenya African National Union
KARI Kenya Agricultural Research Institute
KLDP Kenya Livestock Development Project (1996-81)
KMC Kenya Meat Commission
KREMU Kenya Rangeland Ecological Monitoring unit (now DRSRS)
KVAPS Kenya Veterinary Association Privatization Scheme
LMB Livestock and Meat Board, Ethiopia
LMD Livestock Marketing Division, Kenya
MAB Man and the Biosphere, world-wide UNESCO research program
MOA Ministry of Agriculture, Kenya
MOALD Ministry of Agriculture & Livestock Development Kenya (also MALDA)
NCA Norwegian Church Aid, Ethiopia
NE Northeast (NE Province, Kenya; NE rangelands, Ethiopia)
NEAP Kenya's National Environment Action Plan
NERDU North-East Rangelands Development Unit, Ethiopia
NGO Non-governmental organization
NLDP National Livestock Development Program, Ethiopia
NORAD Norwegian Agency for International Development
OAU Organization for African unity, Addis Ababa
ODA Overseas Development Administration, United Kingdom
OLF Oromo Liberation Front
OP Office of the President, Kenya
PARC Pan-African Rinderpest Campaign
PDRE Peoples Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
PENHA Pastoral and Environmental Network for the Horn of Africa
PIDA Pastoralist Integrated Development Project, Kenya
PMAC Provisional Military Administrative Council, Ethiopia (or Derg)
PMU Project management unit
PRA Participatory rural appraisal
RCC Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, Ethiopia (now become DPPC)
SAP Structural adjustment program
SEPHA United Nations Special Emergency Program for the Horn of Africa
SIDA Swedish International Development Authority
SLDP Second Livestock Development Project, Ethiopia
SORDU Southern Rangelands Development Unit, Ethiopia
SR/GL- Small Ruminant/Global Livestock Collaborative
CRSP Research Support Program, USAID
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
TGE Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TLDP Third Livestock Development Project, Ethiopia
TRP Turkana Rehabilitation Project, Kenya
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific & Cultural Organization
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
UNEP United National Environment Program
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WADU Walyaita Agricultural Development Unit, Ethiopia
WFP World Food Program of the United Nations
WPE Workers' Party of Ethiopia
This report describes the evolving policy environments within adjoining pastoral areas of southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya. Pastoralists here come under three flags: the Kenya flag, for those like the Gabbra, Rendille, and Samburu who live south of the border at Moyale; the flag of the Oromiya state for those living north of Moyale in the Borana and Guji areas, and also the Ethiopian national flag. A major theme in this study will be the complexities of policy formulation and implementation under these different flags, which stand for three major sources of initiative affecting pastoral development.
The need to synthesize a broad overview of pastoral situations in both countries arises for three reasons. In the rangeland areas, some communities have experienced considerable economic turbulence (related perhaps to El Niño weather) and insecurity. Any statements made about particular areas are likely to be rapidly overtaken by further changes - droughts following floods, for example. A second major reason is the weak performance of many past technical interventions in both countries. When so many promising initiatives have made no lasting difference, it is time to look beyond specific technical interventions to larger contexts which might explain poor policy implementation. And, finally, in both Ethiopia and Kenya sweeping changes were under active consideration during the March to July, 1998 period. Neither government had announced its new policies, whose specific form was still under negotation (with the ABD and World Bank, in Ethiopia's case, and with the World Bank and EU in Kenya's case). Furthermore, USAID's own Greater Horn of Africa initiative was itself being translated into specific proposals which were also not known. In such circumstances, the best that outside analysts can do is to examine underlying structural features which constrain policy choice and delineate policies which show greatest promise.
Fieldwork was undertaken in Ethiopia during March and April of 1998, and in Kenya during May and June of 1998. While brief field visits were undertaken in each country, the author was directed to focus on larger issues at the macro level: the government's policies towards pastoral areas, the institutions involved in implementing pastoral policies, and the issues which such policies must address. Special thanks are owed to the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture, to the Oromiya State Government, and to field officials within Ngelle, Yavello, and Moyale; and, in Kenya, to the Office of the President, the Ministry of Agriculture, and district offices in Moyale, Marsabit, Maralal, and Isiolo. The author is especially indebted to fellow collaborative members Dr. Abdulahi Aboud of Egerton University and Ato Solomon Desta. Also, valuable assistance was received from the libraries of ILRI in Addis Ababa and from the World Bank's regional office in Nairobi. Christine Cornelius of the World Bank and George Käsler of the GTZ's Maralal project were especially helpful. Finally, this study could not have been done without the support of the International Livestock Research Institute's Livestock Policy and Planning section, under Dr. Simeon Ehui. The conclusions presented here are, however, the author's own. Since this is only a preliminary report meant to raise issues for discussion, the author (and the CRSP project) would welcome corrections and clarifications from Ethiopians and Kenyans involved in livestock development.
Similarities
1) Ethiopia and Kenya have an intertwined history. They were "opened" to Europe by explorers and elephant hunters in the late 1890s (see Monty Brown's Where Giants Trod, which maps the specific routes explorers took in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia). Ethiopia and Kenya have also shared:
• A common experience of fighting the Italian regime in World War II
• A joint experience of major droughts and local impacts
• A partially integrated market across their common border, especially
for live animal movements
• Repercussions across borders from events, such as the fall of Somalia
in the early 1990s and similar ripple effects from Southern Sudan.
2) In both Ethiopia and Kenya, pastoralists occupy the lower, more marginal
lands which nevertheless constitute the largest share of each country's
land area. However, because each country's capital city and main population
concentrations occur in the highlands, the needs of the pastoral sector
have often been neglected in the past. A major purpose of this CRSP is
to provide information on pastoral systems to assist national leaders in
Ethiopia and Kenya in finding more effective development strategies to
address pastoralists' needs.
3) In both Ethiopia and Kenya, USAID launched the first serious efforts
to create "modern" range management in the early 1960s, with a pilot project
in Borana and a similar NE Rangelands Project in Kenya. Both employed large,
5 block grazing units designed by Frank Abercrombie (Abercrombie 1974).
Though largely forgotten by USAID today, these two major projects still
survive "on the ground" as a set of rectilinear roads and associated water
supplies.
4) In both countries, the people living in pastoral areas are the poorest
in their relative countries, and face a far more difficult development
situation than do the highlanders. Pastoralists tend to be seen by highlanders
as "backward" and uneducated. While there are some pastoral groups with
powerful national connections - the Borana in Ethiopia, for example, and
the Maasai in Kenya - other groups reside as minorities on contested lands.
5) In both countries, the borderlands occupied by pastoralists are militarily
sensitive. At earlier periods these areas were thought to be either disloyal
or potentially disloyal to the regimes in power. As elsewhere, African
leaders feel outsiders should not have major say over policies that have
major security implications. There is consequently an overlaid political
dimension to discussions of development policy for these pastoral areas.
6) In both countries, local population growth in drylands has been high
despite the huge problems. Much of this growth comes from net immigration,
which in turn is composed of either refugees and returnees on the one hand
or from incoming highlanders on the other. Immigration of farmers into
dry lands has increased the human populations vulnerable to drought.
7) In both countries, the pastoral lands are mostly drier and more stressed
than the highlands, and have a distinctive set of ecological challenges
including the large impact of animal diseases upon the economy. How to
privatize veterinary services to assist poor pastoralists in very remote
places is a major question facing both regimes.
8) In both countries, since 1976 there have emerged a network of rural
centers supported by famine relief where the poorest people live. The potential
for "relief urbanization" is a new feature which complicates future policy
choices greatly. The people in these "desert towns" may depend heavily
upon the food aid economy, and usually lack claim to independent local
resources. Some are either refugees or returnees, whose rights to remain
may be contested locally. The constitute a new type of rural "underclass"
often missed in formal statements of development policy towards the pastoral
areas.
9) In both countries, governments have tried to create agricultural
research organizations to promote livestock development. As it happens,
in each instance the country's main agricultural research institutions
(EARO in Addis, and KARI near Nairobi) have parastatal status and their
main focus upon improving crops. Both, too, exist at a long distance from
the major pastoral areas. As a consequence, in Ethiopia the Oromia Agricultural
Research Coordination Office was involved in mid-1998 in establishing a
livestock-oriented research ranch near Yavello. In Kenya, KARI has a long
established program for range research at its Kiboko station far to the
south, but there is a substation at Marsabit (the former IPAL headquarters)
now receiving EU assistance (and thus a prime candidate for collaborative
liaison). Egerton University also maintains its own field station near
Baringo at the edge of the survey area. It would seem that creating an
effective and on-going linkage between pastoral communities and livestock
researchers should take high priority in the CRSP plans. Internationally,
ILRI with two major complexes of facilities and staff in Addis Ababa and
near Nairobi is ideally situated to assist the CRSP team in achieving this
objective.
10) Both Ethiopia and Kenya are experiencing a widening gap between
public and private sector salary levels, with the effect that many top
scientists are seeking NGO or private employment. On the positive side,
this gives the Ethiopian and Kenyan regimes large pools of experienced,
national staff to serve as consultants and planners for new initiatives.
On the negative side, it makes it increasingly difficult to retain good
research staff in remote, publically financed field assignments. (This
also explains the reluctance of some national experts to participate in
thinly-funded CRSP activities.)
11) Ethiopia and Kenya have broadly similar structures for degree and
postgraduate training in the agricultural fields (and in fact cooperate
within a common M.Sc. training program in economics). Ethiopia's agricultural
degree training began in the then Agricultural College of Alemaya (a USAID
project) in 1952, while Kenya's started with a diploma college at Egerton
(also receiving subsequent USAID support). Egerton eventually became a
University, as did Alemaya in 1985/86. Each institution struggles for its
share of funds with an older and well-established national university -
for Ethiopians, the Addis Ababa University (with an excellent M.Sc. program
in economics), and for Kenyans, with the University of Nairobi (with its
own Faculty of Agriculture and Department of Range Management).
In both countries, too, the government has established additional institutions
whose training overlaps Alemaya's and Egerton's. For Alemaya, the competition
comes from Asmara University in the north - an institution to which Alemaya's
M.Sc. training in agricultural economics was moved - and from the Awassa
College of Agriculture in the south (being upgraded to University status
in mid-1998). For Egerton, there is nearby Moi University active in environmental
and natural resource fields, and the Kenyatta University of Agriculture
(a Japanese aid project just outside Nairobi).
12) A paper by Habtemarian Kassa (1996:163) points out that the facilties
USAID designed at Alemaya for 200 students now accommodate over 1,200 "using
roughly the same facilities." At Egerton, a large block of offices, classrooms,
and laboratories stands uncompleted because of a past dispute between USAID
and GOK. It would seem a good time, then, to commence equipping Ethiopia's
and Kenya's agricultural graduates to deal intelligently with the problems
of pastoral development.
Differences
The similarities itemized above make it productive to treat Ethiopia's
and Kenya's pastoralists as comparable cases. The differences, however,
are what make these cases especially interesting from a policy perspective.
They also constitute an important reason for conducting parallel research
studies, as in the CRSP.
1) The boundary between Ethiopia and northern Kenya roughly coincides
with an ecological division between better watered perennial grassland
which becomes bush thicket when misused or protected from annual fires,
and the drier arid lowlands characteristic of Kenya's Chalbi, Koroli and
Kaisut deserts. For many years Ethiopian officials have tried to prohibit
annual burning, thereby intensifying the problems of bush encroachment
within Borana rangelands. In Kenya, the vast lava fields provide insufficient
vegetation for either cattle or annual fires, and the people are more likely
to emphasize camels and goats as the basis of their livelihood.
2) The road network from Addis Ababa to Moyale is paved, and there were
regular Ethiopian airways flights to Ngelle (in early 1998). In contrast,
the El Niño rains of late 1997 had destroyed large sections of the
unpaved highway from Isiolo northwards within Kenya, greatly restricting
the movement of people, stock and goods from Moyale and Marsabit southwards
towards Nairobi. As of mid-1998, then, physical movement within livestock
areas was considerably easier on the Ethiopian side of the border - at
least along the north-south corridor within reach of the main roads. Kenyan
officials were negotiating donor assistance to rebuild their entire north-south
road system (all the way from the port at Mombasa).
3) The two countries have adopted major policies to give local areas
a significant say in their own governance. Kenya did this from 1984 onwards
with a "district focus" approach, a deconcentration of finance and power
to the district level. An excellent policy, this initiative faltered when
Scandinavian donor funding was terminated and it became clear that little
real power had been relinquished at the center. Ethiopia following the
1991-93 change in regime has instituted a federal structure, which devolves
national powers to the state governments (here Oromiya State occupying
the former Region Four). As of mid-1998, this transition is still underway,
making it too early to assess how it will operate once fully implemented.
(Of course the outbreak of hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia added
a further complication just as this report was being written). Nevertheless,
in the abstract "deconcentration" and "federalism" constitute the two main
alternatives for devolving power to local units, and so make the contrast
between Kenya's more mature policy and Ethiopia's especially interesting.
4) In line with these two policies, Ethiopia's new structure for its
Ministry of Agriculture puts the federal Ministry into a purely advisory
role. The Kenya MOALD (Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development)
still retains executive control over its field agencies, but lacks funding
to do very much operationally. If Ethiopia's policies continue their trend
up to early 1998, the MOA will have very little operational power over
the extension services, which are now assigned to the State Governments
for policy and implementation.
5) Another major difference is the presence in Ethiopia of a large parastatal
banking system, the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE). This Bank is more
than 50 years old, and is one of the top ten banks in all sub-Saharan Africa.
It employs 5,000 staff located in 170 branches, including at Ngelle, Yavello,
and Moyale - the three main towns serving the CRSP's Ethiopian area. From
interviews, it was clear that CBE has established these remote branches
in hopes of promoting future growth rather than on the basis of their present
miniscule deposits. There is also (see Ziedy, 1996) some question whether
the CBE's precarious balance between assets and liabilities will allow
it to continue to subsidize its unprofitable rural branches. In Kenya,
by way of contrast, the long established commercial banks in Moyale, Marsabit,
and Isiolo have contracted their coverage over recent decades, discontinuing
the mobile banking they once offered (perhaps because of recent insecurities).
They also apply commercial criteria when evaluating profitability. By and
large, it seems Ethiopia's rural banking is heavily subsidized whereas
Kenya's banks are withdrawing from the peripheral regions they once attempted
to serve. (This suggests a need to learn why.) Other reports funded by
this CRSP describe the banking situation in detail.
6) Ethiopia's previous Derg regime established "peasant associations"
(PAs) as the basic unit within which people were registered and to which
they paid taxes. In the highlands, people were forced to move into consolidated
villages - a source of much of the Derg's unpopularity. In the lowlands
like Borana, however, the PA served mainly as an organizing device, identifying
a person's registered place of residence. Under the present Ethiopian Federal
Democratic Republic (EFDR), PAs continue but have been amalgamated to form
larger units with about 5,000 members. Each PA assembly elects a PA Chairman
and an executive committee, and is also represented in the Wereda
(or district) council. (See the NCA 1997 report by Helland, Olafsson, Ato
Teshome Woldesemayat, and Gufu Oba, pp. 37-42.) Some PAs in the Borana
also formed into service co-operatives, a major focus of SORDU's activities
in its final phase of World Bank support (here see Hogg, 1990). Further
discussion of these developments occurs in Chapter 7.
While Kenya is also organized into sub-locations and locations (administered
respectively by sub-chiefs and chiefs), these are mainly territorial units
and do not have the intensive internal organization characteristic of Ethiopian
PAs. Kenya's cooperatives are associated with cash crops like coffee, but
have not tried to organize pastoralists.
7) Ethiopia's pastoralists are for the most part still illiterate and
uneducated. Education took root in Kenya one generation earlier, and Kenya's
pastoralists have a sizable number of school leavers at the Form IV level
and even local communities where most children now attend school. Similarly,
Kenya's pastoralists seem much more dependent on the commercial economy,
itself in part dictated by the necessity of earning school fees. Consequently,
in Ethiopia the stress is on building schools and then getting pastoralists
to send their children, while in Kenya it is on how to pay for education
and also how to get better performance (many pastoral children do very
poorly when in school).
The issue of differential education participation and then performance
has not yet been adequately studied for either southern Ethiopia or northern
Kenya. An important source which looks at this question for the Maasai
of Narok is Killian Holland's (1996) book, The Maasai: On the Horns
of a Dilemma.
8) Associated with the difference in educational participation is the
relatively large role of NGOs in provision of pastoral services in Kenya,
and the smaller role accorded NGOs in Ethiopia. Currently, Kenya has encouraged
local NGOs as a device for assisting remote communities and as a means
to capture increased donor funding. (These days, international donors often
prefer to work with "private sector" NGOs rather than through governmental
agencies.) Ethiopia's view (as expressed to us) is that NGOs should fit
their programs into the government's development priorities, should focus
upon expanding local capacities, and should have a definite plan for their
eventual withdrawal. Thus early 1998 was a time of considerable uncertainty
among NGOs working within Ethiopia as they reorganized their efforts to
fit within the government's new guidelines.
9) There is also a major difference with regard to languages. Kenya's
officials are almost all fluent in both Kiswahili and English, while using
their "tribal" languages with those from the same area. In Kenya major
policies are given in English - witness the 1998 Budget Speech broadcast
live in English nationally and listened to avidly by Kenyan citizens.
In Ethiopia, while university education is in English many officials
are not fully at ease with English and official documents are issued both
in Amharic and English. The various state governments have their own languages,
which are especially numerous in Sidamo bordering on Borana. Within Borana
itself, the Oromifa language is used for government documents and for most
field communication. In general, language differences make it difficult
for Ethiopia to offer mass education and standardize extension packages
suited to all areas and groups.
10) Ethiopia's civil regime has been subjected to huge changes over
the past thirty years: first, the fall of the Imperial regime in the 1970s
and then the collpase of the socialist Derg regime in early 1991. Adults
have thus been under a traditional monarchy, a radical socialist regime
imposing villagization, a civil war, and now a Federal Republic.
Kenya's policies and administration have been characterized by greater
continuity. In northern Kenya, the District Commissioner's offices still
list the names going back to the colonial period (in Isiolo, to 1929!).
Officials use the same uniforms and the same designations as did their
predecessors. However, this stability of the Kenya administration--a major
objective of the Kenya Government (see Moi 1986:136-151)--contrasts with
considerable behind-the-scenes political turbulence within Kenya as the
government moved to and then away from one-party rule. (In this author's
experience, Kenyan officials tend to view politicians as a disruptive force
in Kenya's development.)
11) The fact that so many documents are published in English, and the
large role of the donor community in Kenya, plus the large number of resident
expatriates all combine to make the Kenyan system seem relatively transparent.
In contrast to Kenya, Ethiopia is still undergoing a major reorganization
of its administration. Policy responsibilities between regional and central
authorities are still being devised and negotiated. Officials may not be
fluent in English, and were (in 1998) reluctant to discuss policies that
had not yet received final approval or were still ambiguous.
Differences
We turn now to the core of this paper, a comparative review of the different policies Ethiopia and Kenya have pursued since the 1960s in their attempts to develop the traditional pastoral sectors. While in both countries the policies cluster into three, overlapping sets, the basic differences can be related to fundamental differences in the pastoral sectors between Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia's large population and great poverty meant that the Imperial Government was starting almost from scratch in the late 1960s when establishing a commercial beef industry among its pastoralists. Then, after a military coup and revolution in 1974, its socialist policies were directed towards creating peasant associations compatible with public lands and public entrepreneurship. Kenya, on the other hand, achieved self-rule from the British in 1963 and full independence in 1964. It inherited well developed livestock services oriented towards minority owned mixed farms and ranches in the Rift Valley highlands. Its policies attempted to extend its already robust livestock industry into the remote, pastoral areas which were however lower in population and potential than Ethiopia's. In both countries, policy-making in the third, most recent phases occurs against a backdrop of sometimes dramatic political events, summarized in Tables 1 and 2. Let us begin with a review of Kenya's policies, used by donors as a model for other national programs, before going on to examine Ethiopia's evolving livestock policies and programs.
The Harambee Policies (1963 - 78)
Because Kenya achieved "home rule" under Jomo Kenyatta as Prime Minister in mid-1963, its initial policies predate its independence as a republic at the end of 1964. Kenyatta's espousal of "Harambee" politics (or "let-us-pull-together") were aimed at retaining the confidence of Kenya's minority farmers and ranches living in the Rift Valley, while bringing Africans into control over Kenya's well developed services and institutions. Towards pastoralists, however, the colonial regime had done little beyond a few African Land Development (or ALDEV) schemes aimed at localized land rehabilitation (Mwangata 1986). Kenya's veterinary services were substantial, but mainly protected its European livestock raisers (Grey 1963). While in addition a few ALDEV grazing blocks had been established in more remote places like Masailand, Baringo, and West Pakot, it remains generally true that "the colonial period was one of almost total neglect of the pastoral areas" (Liveingstone 1986:251). Indeed, the northern districts lay within Kenya's Northern Frontier District, closed to outsiders for security reasons.
The main task facing Jomo Kenyatta's government in regard to the livestock sector was consequently to try to bring Africans into an already well developed system (von Kaufmann 1976). UNDP/FAO assistance (1964-73) was crucial in allowing the reappointment of expatriate staff who had already worked in Kenya (notably David Pratt, author of a text on range management in East Africa). The FAO/UNDP project established a Range Management Division in Kenya's Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) in 1963; Pratt became the first head of this Division (Keya 1998:5). From his base within MOA, Pratt and his team then mobilized World Bank/IDA support for an ambitious new Kenya Livestock Development Project (KLDP), implemented in two main phases from 1969 onwards with multiple donor assistance (USAID, CIDA and ODA). This was the Bank's first large investment project directed towards African livestock producers. It was meant as a pilot venture to be replicated elsewhere. As described by Livingstone (1986;252-53), the KLDP had by 1974 five main components:
• grazing block developments in the NE Province (under USAID)
• finance for 148 commercial ranches
• group ranches for pastoralists in Kajiado, West Pakot and Kwale
• co-operative society ranches to take over some European ranches
• stock routes and holding grounds to link pastoralists to urban markets
In practice, the KLDP did not meet its ambitious targets. Ole Sadera (1986:19) says that from KLDP's phase one only 15 group ranches and 41 private ranches were developed, adding that a "large portion" of Phase II loan was used to reschedule loans in default under Phase I because of the 1975-76 drought. The Bank, however, portrayed KLDP Phase I as a success even though its own audit report did not support this conclusion. Phase II was expected to last five years and added US $21.5 million, but because of numerous delays was extended through 1981 and expended only $12.4 million (World Bank 1985). It continued Phase one's focus on ranch development, grazing schemes, and livestock marketing while adding special funds to assist Kenya's national parks (Amboseli, Maasai Mara, and Nairobi) and to create the Kenya Rangeland Ecological Monitoring Unit (KREMU, recently become the DRSS). It also brought in additional districts (Lamu, Narok, Samburu, and Machakos) and expanded professional training for Kenya's African staff.
Only three of the KLDP's components overlapped Kenya's northern pastoral districts of concern here. The project included an ambitions experiment in granting group tenure to ranches within pastoral areas under Kenya's Land (Group Representatives) Act of 1968. We should note that after 20 years of implementation, the bulk of Kenya's 159 registered group ranches were found in Rift Valley Province (129), where Samburu District's 27 group ranches averaged 12,315 ha in size (ole Sadera 1986:27).
Then there was a very different USAID designed sub-project to construct immense grazing blocks within Kenya's wild (and desert) Northeast. Using heavy equipment, USAID constructed water points and firebreaks in a pilot area half way between Wajir and Garissa, while also training some 100 Kenyans on livestock topics. The KLDP II goal had been to cover 7.5 million acres within these blocks (World Bank 1985, Annex 4). However, the whole venture encountered huge problems including the fact that the local Somali were camel and not beef producers and the disruption of the 1977 Somali/Ethiopian war, when Somali forces actually invaded Ethiopia from the south coming through Kenya's Northeast. USAID eventually concluded its part of the KLDP "fell far short of meeting original objectives" and terminated further assistance (World Bank 1985, based on USAID's 1983 completion report).
And, finally, the KLDP provided funds to facilitate the flow of surplus animals from "cow/calf" operations by pastoralists into Kenya's developed urban economy. In the North, four major stock routes were planned, linking up at Wajir and passing to Isiolo (where a major holding ground would hold stock under quarantine), supplemented by two subsidiary routes from northern Isiolo amd Marsabit. To manage this vast network of stock routes and holding grounds, the KLDP established a Livestock Marketing Division (LMD), within the MOA. However, the Kenya Government refused to lift controlled meat prices, the very lengthy northern stock routes never became fully operational, and there were long delays in constructing water points by a newly created Ministry of Water Development. There was also no recognized, district-level body (similar to Ethiopia's SORDU) which could coordinate these interventions in the field.
Under the colonial regime, Kenya had established the Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) with a large slaughter facility outside Nairobi to serve as a "last resort" market for cattle (Raikes 1981:191-303). After its establishment in 1970, the LMD was meant to supply about 50,000 cattle annually rising to 100,000 by KLDP's end. Instead Kenya's rising budgetary deficits from the late 1970s cut off funds to the LMD. By 1982, the LMD handled less than 500 animals and in 1983/84 lost Treasury support entirely (Mweya 1986:329). Thus ended Kenya's attempt to set up a parastatal marketing organization which would buy and then resell stock from Kenya's distant northern pastoralists.
The Nyayo Policies (1979-98)
Daniel T. arap Moi assumed office in August of 1978, following the death of President Kenyatta. Among the Kalenjin peoples (a minority in Kenya's population) from whom Moi comes, "nyayo" means roughly "follow-in-steps." Moi's regime did, in fact, continue most of Kenyatta's policies, but added a distinct focus upon Kenya's Arid and Semi-arid Lands (or ASALs)--those lands with between 200 and 800 mm of annual rainfall (Wiggins 1985:94). This should not be surprising: Moi grew up near Kabarnet, at the edge of Kenya's northern Rift Valley, where its wandering pastoralists are a frequent sight.
Moi's policies towards the ASAL districts were set out officially in a 1979 document, revised in 1992, and also figured prominently in Kenya's 1989-93 National Development Plan. Their major long term goal was "to improve the standard of living of the ASAL population by integrating ASAL into the main-stream of the national economy and social development in an environmentally sustainable manner" (GOK 1992:6). Ten subsidiary goals were listed:
• developing human resources and institutional capacities to carry out projects and programs
• strengthening community participation
• encouraging adoption of low-cost, appropriate technologies
• reclaiming and protecting stressed environments
• introducing risk-minimizing agro-pastoral packages
• opening new channels for off-farm employment in micro-enterprises
• improving delivery of education, health and extension services
• upgrading infrastructure for communities
For donors, then, the "problem" with Kenya's post-1978 policies is their continued reliance upon what some call Kenya's "managed open economy" rather than the "market led" policies which Western donors insist all African nations should adopt (see our discussion below of Kenya's "structural adjustment" phase). For Kenya's pastoralists, the problem has been a continued gap between attractive policies and what actually happens "in the field" far across the deserts from Kenya's Nairobi-based politicians.
Moi's government did many of the things which could be addressed by central initiatives. A new university was created outside Kitale in western Kenya, and given environmental management as its special mandate (Moi 1986). A Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources was created, which in 1994 issued The Kenya National Environment Action Plan, or NEAP (see particularly chapter 5, "desertification and drought"). Intensified, area-based planning was undertaken with donor support under World Bank-style "integrated agricultural development programmes" (IADP) with a focus on expanded small holder credit, notably the EEC assisted Machakos Integrated Development Programme (Livingstone 1985:335). Special responsibility for the ASAL districts was vested in a newly created Ministry of Reclamation and Developmen of Arid, Semi-arid Areas and Wastelands which, however, was eventually merged into the Ministry of Rural Development. (Today ASAL responsibilities insofar as donor support is concerned occur in the Office of the President.)
As we have just seen, the Nyayo policies put the territorial administration firmly in command of initiatives to address ASAL needs. This central role was reinforced by the government's need to respond to increasingly frequent droughts from 1979/80 onwards, and by the nearly total reliance of the Kenya government on external financing for any new ASAL investment projects.
Kenya's 1979/80 drought was centered along its northwest border, where Turkana pastoralists were heavily affected (though more so in the north than in the south). NORAD's initial attempts to assist the Turkana only showed that narrow-focus, sectoral interventions were of little benefit under emergency conditions. Instead, a district-wide Turkana Rehabilitation Project (TRP) emerged to coordinate relief and rehabilitation activities throughout Turkana between 1980 and 1987, led by Dutch assistance but involving also many other donors. Turkana pioneered Kenya's famine early warning system, restocking projects, community-based revegetation, field livestock centers, and community-based inoculation campaigns. When in 1984 a national drought struck, it was the Kenya administration's recent Turkana experience which guided its responses. Similarly, for NGOs their greater local involvement was a crucial testing ground for subsequent activities elsewhere. OXFAM, Farm Africa (founded in 1985), and Actionaid became major players assisting the district administration in Samburu and Isiolo, while the Dutch Government and GTZ became lead donors addressing respectively famine early warning and local technical initiatives in Samburu and Marsabit. And, finally, religiously based NGOs became the accepted GOK conduit for World Food Programme assistance in much of northern Kenya. Generally, Kenya's 1980s pastoral development policies were disaster and relief driven, rather than focusing on improved technical interventions (Wiggins 1985; Downing et al. 1990; Buchanan-Smith & Davies 1995).
The one major exception within our study districts was Hugh Lamprey's 1976 "Integrated Project on Arid Lands" (IPAL) which became a UNESCO supported Man in Biosphere (MAB) site for studying local processes of desertification within an ecosystem context. A major UN Conference on Desertification was held at UNEP in Nairobi in 1977. Kenya's isolated Marsabit District seemed an ideal place where the impact of pastoralists on an overstressed local environment could be documented by a multidisciplinary scientific team. Ultimately, over 28 major technical reports were produced describing present land use and husbandry practices in a 22,500 km square area of desert west of Marsabit town.
IPAL went through three phases and two revisions between 1976 and 1984 (Lusigi 1986). Under its Kenyan director, Dr. Walter Lusigi, it became the Kenya Arid Lands Research Station (KALRES) under KARI. It obtained EEC and GTZ funds for applied extension research involving everything from stocking rates to demonstration camel herds, pastoral associations, mobile "camel back" retailers, and even organized stock buying (Oba 1992, 1994; Timberlake 1987:61-72). However, Fratkin (1991) judges IPAL and contemporaneous mission activites as a disaster, akin for local Ariaal Rendille to a drought in respect to the stresses these interventions placed upon pastoralists.
With major droughts returning to Kenya in 1984 and then 1991/92 (in the northern ASAL districts), the Kenya Government drew upon the Turkana experience with TRP to negotiate several additional emergency projects aimed at the northern ASAL zone which had been largely neglected earlier. Key interventions included:
Two other policies, towards veterinary privatization and wildlife, require mention. Kenya's veterinary profession has long seemed an obvious candidate for privatization (Leonard 1993). In 1988, the GOK stopped automatic employment of the University of Nairobi's annual output of 60 veterinarians. From 1994, the policy has been that public veterinarians are withdrawn from districts with private service. In late 1994 the Kenya Veterinary Association launched an EU supported privatization scheme (KVAPS) which advances loan guarantees for the start-up costs of entering private practice. By 1994, there were 154 private veterinary practices in Kenya, though none within the 17 ASAL districts (1995 figures cited in a draft Consortium BCEOM/SATEC report, 1998:53-54). Meanwhile, on a pilot basis Kenya's Director of Veterinary Services has also allowed some exemptions from the legal requirement that only licensed veterinarians can handle and supervise scheduled drugs. USAID, UNICEF, and EU funded programs have supported private paravets, called "community-based animal health workers" (and equivalent to the GOK's "Junior Animal Health Assistants") to administer injections and conduct inoculations, usually with profits returning to a community-supervised revolving fund. As of mid-1998, such activities run under the Pan-African Rinderpest Campaign (or PARC-VAC) through the OAU were considered quite successful. (A USAID field evaluation of such activities in Turkana was just completed in April of 1998.)
Finally, there is the problem that Kenya's major wildlife resources
overlap its pastoral areas and could not survive without pastoralists'
protection (Western 1997:94-110). Until recently, tourism was Kenya's leading
foreign exchange earner, 28% of such revenues in the early 1990s (Ndulu
& Mwega 1994:111). To protect the wildlife tourists come to see, the
GOK has experimented with game reserves, national parks, licenced hunting
blocks, shared park revenues, an outright ban on hunting, and even military-style
wars on poachers. Kenya's wildlife officials spear-headed a world-wide
ban on ivory sales (Western 1997:233-254). The appointment of Richard Leakey
and then David Western to head Kenya's Wildlife Service by President Moi
is significant. However, Western's gripping account shows that many senior
Kenyan wildlife officials have seen their careers destroyed by opposition
from well-organized poaching interests (a carry-over from the Kenyatta
years). Today, in northern Kenya an influx of raiders and illegal arms
could have the same impact as yesterday's mass poaching. The loss of tourism
revenues from internationally reported incidents was having a devastating
impact on Samburu and Isiolo County Council finances in mid-1998.
The Structural Adjustment Policies (1982-99)
By the late 1970s, Kenya began to experience persistent budgetary deficits nationally, despite a temporary boom in coffee prices from 1976-78. By 1980/81, the deficit reached a record level of over 10 per cent of GDP (Bevan et al. 1990:253). In response, the GOK issues four policy papers between 1980 and 1984 setting out what would be termed today a "structural adjustment program" (or SAP). While these policies did restore self-sufficiency in maize production (through higher controlled prices to farmers), the overall macro situation remained grim.
Prodded by international donors, the GOK finally issued its 1982 Sessional Paper (no. 4) Development Prospects and Policies which advocated limited privatization and austerity. Maxon and Ndege (1995:154-56) describe the changes as a gradual elimination of protective tariffs, remission of price controls, devaluation of the Kenya shilling, and a better system of import licensing. President Moi is quoted saying: "In view of the substantial government deficits and serious balance-of-payments problems, the government had decided to reduce its subsidies to parastatals and may even withdraw its participation from businesses which have failed to perform well" (Aseto & Okello 1997:122). The cautious tenor of these remarks is significant. While Moi did set up a Task Force on divestiture (one of several successive bodies), the pace of government disengagement from its "managed open economy" remained deliberate and slow. Finally, in Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986, the GOK committed itself to more complete liberalization and privatization in a document which laid out an indicative plan for Kenya's economy up to the year 2000.
Meanwhile, these were especially tumultuous years in Kenya's politics, commencing with an abortive coup by Air Force officers in 1982 (see Table 1). The World Bank had switched a large share of its Third World lending from development projects like the KLDP to structural adjustment, typically accompanied by even more stringent IMF-imposed "stabilization" conditionalities. Other African countries had been forced to accept the IMF package, so why not now Kenya? The US, through its ambassador Smith Hempstone (1989-93), sought to force Moi to reverse his regime's 1982 adoption of a de jure one-party state. There were more frequent droughts, in 1979/80 for northern Kenya, nationally in 1984, and again in 1992 for Kenya's north. Somalia's government fell apart, sending a flood of refugees into eastern Kenya. Ethiopia's DERG regime also collapsed, followed by more refugees into Kenya. In Kenya itself, there was open corruption, assassinations, and student riots. In November of 1991 the international donors as a group froze all discretionary disbursement of external aid.
How, in retrospect, are we to explain this turn of events, and what
impact did it have on the distant pastoral areas? Clearly, as Aseto and
Okello document at many points (1997), the Kenya Government has moved very
slowly when implementing its announced goal of privatization. As late as
1991, Kenya's parastatals employed 170,000 of Kenya's 715,000 formal jobs,
contributing to 11% to GDP and 16% of gross capital formation (1997:121).
As Nelson (1984), Leonard (1987), and others had argued, Kenya's administration
needed the support of its public sector workers and the patronage which
the Government's control of parastals provided (see also Bevan et al. 1990:253).
Kenya's "controlled, open economy" had earlier achieved a strong economic
record, which Moi's Nyayo policies had vowed to build upon (1986).
And there was the fact, well understood among Kenya's senior economists, that Kenya depends heavily on export crop earnings and tourism for its investment and growth. This makes the economy vulnerable to external shocks (like the 1984 drought), and reduces the attractiveness of laissez-faire policies which generally accentuate price swings, speeding investment in boom years but yielding (these days) nearly instantaneous flights of capital in bad times. As Ndulu and Mwega (1994:102) put it,
Countercyclical management becomes extremely important for economic
stability. Net foreign resource inflows have tended to be procyclical ...
which puts even more stress on economic management.
We face here an unacknowledged war between paradigms. At the very time when the Kenya Government's restrained management of food purchases to offset the 1984 drought was being praised (Cohen & Lewis 1987), the World Banks's economists and less sympathetic observers (Bates 1989:93-122) were condemning it for gross patronage and inefficiency. Buchanan-Smith and Davies (1995) argue that whereas the Kenya Government's response to Turkana's 1990 drought was well managed, by the time of the 1991/92 drought relations to donors had deteriorated so badly that the response was far less effective.
Other than in regard to food relief, most of the "structural adjustment"
battles in Kenya concerned national, macro policies. In 1992, the World
Bank published its country study of Kenya, calling for a reduced public
sector role. The Kenya Government did eventually lift price controls, and
free its currency exchanges to depend on market rates (in 1994 the Kenya
shilling became fully convertible). Multiparty elections were restored
in 1992, and in November of 1993 donors recommenced aid disbursements.
In November of 1994, the Bank and GOK embarked on a major project to slim
the civil service, drawing on an IDA credit for US $25 million in a total
program estimated to cost US $156 million (World Bank 1994). And, finally,
in mid-1998 the EU, the World Bank, and GOK officials were in intense negotiations
to reorganize the Ministry of Agriculture, sending many of its senior officials
into early retirement -- some of the very officials USAID had trained for
their present public sector roles.
Ethiopia's livestock policies overlap three distinct regimes: in the
1960s under the Imperial Government of Haile Selassie; a post-1974 socialist
period under Mengistu's Derg regime; and a post-1991 shift towards liberalization
under the Transitional Government now confirmed in office by national elections.
These three regimes have had very different policies' outlined in Table
2. Yet, paradoxically, linked pastoral developments were slow to emerge
and then were carried over into the next regime. The Imperial Government's
growing reliance on the World Bank was continued and intensified under
the Derg government's initial years. Similar, the Derg's major livestock
projects still survive as possible models for today's liberalized regime.
The disjuncture occurs because, as Hogg (1993) points out, successive Ethiopian
regimes have been unsure how to adapt policies designed for highlands to
the vastly different circumstances of Regions 4 and 5, the Borana and Somali
lowlands of greatest interest here. This uncertainty protected the Borana
area from the worst excesses of the Derg regime, and continues into the
present. Only one account has been located which describes how Ethiopia's
pastoral policies evolved, Desta's (1993) paper, used heavily for much
that follows. On Ethiopia's agriculture policies, Dejene's 1987 book is
also an excellent source.
The Imperial Government's Policies (1960s - 1974)
By the 1960's when our review commences, Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie had been in power for over thirty years. His Imperial Government began to take a more active role vis-a-vis the countryside in the post-World War II period. An Agricultural College was built with US assistance in 1952 at Alemaya, within Selassie's home area of Harar. It meant that senior MOA officials were trained at Oklahoma State, which held the Alemaya contract, and on their return began building a "land grant" style extension system with a focus on "self-help" community development (Kassa 1996:168).
Nationally, Haile Selassie took steps to position Ethiopia at the forefront of Africa's newly emerging nations. In 1963, the Organization of African Unity was created with its headquarters in Addis Ababa. A UN Economic Commission for Africa was located nearby. In 1964, a Livestock and Meat Board (LMD) was established and given the role of promoting the emergence of a modern meat industry within Ethiopia. It helped develop veterinary services to control animal diseases in the pastoral areas, and also worked with the World Bank and FAO in negotiating the World Bank funded Second Livestock Development Project, initiated in 1973 (Desta 1993:45-46).
The US role in Ethiopia's livestock sector preceded the SLDP, however. In the mid-1960s, it implemented the Yavello Rangelands Pilot Project covering 2,400 square kilometers of Borana rangelands (Desta 1963:46). The main technical idea was that by shifting to a deferred grazing, rotational block system, the Boran could substantially increase beef output. The Project used heavy equipment to cut fire-breaks and perimeter roads around huge, rectilinear blocks (still visible in the countryside near Yavello). Large reservoirs, termed "ponds", were built to serve each rotation. What actually happed was that spontaneous settlements grew up around each of the reservoirs, while Boran elders failed to observe the planned grazing rotations and failed to punish trespassers (Desta 1993:46). The "pilot project" became seriously overgrazed and degraded - a condition still evident today, over 30 years later.
The main thrust of the Imperial Government was not toward the distant pastoral areas, but rather focused on introducing Ethiopia to modern, high input farming. In 1966, the Institute of Agricultural Research (IAR) was set up on land near Addis Ababa alongside the CGIAR's new International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA), also negotiated at this time. Among donors, SIDA took the lead in promoting a "package" approach to high yielding varieties. It funded the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) within the Arsi highlands (north of Borana) from 1967 onwards. CADU was Ethiopia's first integrated rural development project, a fore-runner of many World Bank Projects of a similar nature all across the Third World. CADU combined the functions of several ministries within its project area: adaptive research on crop varieties and livestock production, input supply (with a strong emphasis on fertilizer adoption), credit and marketing assistance (to pay for increased use of purchased inputs), and generalized soil and water conservation practices. The rationale was that high input farming could not show its potential unless improved practices were adopted as a package, so that modern varieties were matched to better plant nutrition and were in turn supported by on-farm credit.
Indeed, CADU was a success, leading to rapid yield increases. Then the unanticipated occurred. When landlords saw the profits tenants realized from their high-yielding varieties, they promptly evicted the tenants and expanded their own farming (Dejene 1987:17, Cohen 1975). It became clear that without land reform, the outsiders to whom Menelik's Imperial government had given Arsi lands would be the main beneficiaries of improved local farming (Stahl 1974, Gebregziabher 1975).
The CADU "success" was nevertheless influential as a model for other donors, such as the World Bank's Walyaita Agricultural Development Unit (WADU) established in 1971 and USAID's Ada District Development Project (ADDP). CADU lasted nearly twenty years, and went through three phases to become the Arsi Rural Development Unit (ARDU) applied to its entire region. It set the mold for the MOA's approach to extension throughout Ethiopia. For areas not under CADU, WADU, or ADDP, the MOA developed a similar "comprehensive package program" (CPP) which stressed geographically delimited areas stratified by ecological zones and within which complementary inputs would be supplied. The MOA developed seven "packages" for use nationally, matched to differing degrees of intensification within the farming system (Kassa 1996:168 ff).
Unfortunately, extensive pastoral production of the types employed by Ethiopia's 3 million Boran, Afar and Somali nomads has no part within such a scheme. Dejene admits that for his farmers, shortages of oxen were "the most serious problem they faced in farming operations" (1987:102). Goyder & Goyder (1988) suggest this was a general problem throughout the highlands during the traumatic 1985-86 famine years. Yet in the early 1972, neither MOA nor ILCA saw the crucial role which the lowlands play when supplying replacement stock to adjacent highland plough farmers. Scientists looked instead at pastoral animals as potential beef slaughter stock. The LMP's Second Livestock Development Project neglected actual linkages between the lowland and highland agricultural systems, while promoting a hypothetical national beef industry which existed nowhere outside of the planner's idealized maps.
The Imperial Government's failure to comprehend the realities average Ethiopians were encountering came back to haunt Haile Selassie himself, leading ultimately to his death in 1975. The key event which triggered Selassie's downfall was his administration's tardy and completely inadequate response to Ethiopia's 1973 famine. As Goyder & Goyder note, the MOA's report for crop production in 1972 had warned of impending famine (1988:81):
Not only were the drought areas accurately identified down to the district
level but the telling signs of disaster - rising grain prices, an acute
shortage of purchasing power, and the falling value of livestock in exchange
for grain were reported.
The Imperial Administration did nothing. It ignored requests from regional
governors for grain to feed a total population of nearly two million. No
food reserves were held commensurate with the scale of the unfolding disaster,
because the famine struck different areas in different seasons. It began
in the north, progressed into Harerge on the east, and from 1973 to 1975
affected the Ogaden (Goyder & Goyder 1988:81). Finally, public outrage
at the government's failure to act brought about the resignation of Ethiopia's
Prime Minister, and in mid 1974 the creation of a new national agency to
deal with drought. The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RCC) was to
play a crucial role in Ethiopia's next major drought during 1982-86 (Jansson,
Harris & Penrose 1987).
The Socialist Derg Policies (1974-1991)
The events of 1974 sealed Emperor Haile Selassie's fate, though things might easily have taken a different turn had people understood what was happening (Georgis 1989:5-53). In June a shadowy committee of 108 military men - representing all branches at different levels - was constituted taking from Ethiopia's ancient Géez the name dergue or "committee of equals". More commonly, it was called the Coordinating Committee. Initially, its members had no ideology and no intention of deposing the Emperor. They were soon joined by radical students and teachers from Haile Selassie I University, several thousand mostly Marxists. The Emperor was by then in his eighties. He seems to have believed the Derg would carry out a general "house cleaning," but would leave him in power. However, within the Derg was a smaller group of planners. Their leader, Major Mengistu Haile Mariam, was a non-Amhara and still comparatively junior. Mengistu had been to the US for a nine month Army training course. He returned bitterly anti-US because of racist incidents; he had equal hatred for the old order in Ethiopia. His inner group joined forces with the radical students to move the Derg steadily leftwards, culminating with the arrest of the Emperor himself on 12 September 1974.
The details of Mengistu's consolidation in power do not concern us here. We note simply that the Derg, or Coordinating Committee, became the Provisional Military Administrative Council, which in turn came under the Worker's Party of Ethiopia in 1979. Already by 1977, Mengistu had established himself as an absolute ruler in the Stalinist mode. In September of 1987 he finally dissolved the Military Council, becoming instead the General Secretary of the WPE and President of the Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Giorgis 1989:56-68). For simplicity's sake, I shall use the "Derg" label to refer to Mengistu's regime in all its successively more authoritarian transformations. We should remember that Mengistu's leadership was ruthless and bloody from the start. In person, however, Mengistu was soft-spoken and charming (Giorgis 1989:56-68).
The Derg regime under Mengistu moved rapidly to consolidate its mandate. On March 4, 1975, the regime nationalized all land and industry in Ethiopia (proclamation no. 31). It vested control of rural lands in peasant associations, or PAs. On July 26, the Derg outlawed the ownership of more than one home, and confiscated all extra houses for the nation.
Nevertheless, it was the land reforms which proved most popular. The ideal size for a peasant association was stated to be 800 ha (2,000 acres), with 275 households. As Dejene points out, pre-revolutionary land tenure in Ethiopia was extraordinarily complex, with some the greatest inequities in the south where large landlords predominated in the grain-growing regions (1987:30). Dejene found 61% of his sampled Arsi farmers had been tenants, and only 30% former owner-cultivators. (Earlier studies showed approximately 50% as tenants.) Of Dejene's former tenants, about one third had been evicted from their land prior to the revolution; a majority of them regained the same land under the 1975 proclamation (1987:31). This explains why the Agrarian Reform was implemented with only localized resistance. As Dejene explains (1987:33):
Peasants in the tenancy-ridden south were more enthusiastic about the
Reform that those with a communal tenure in the north... Since tenants
in the north are landowners themselves, officials of the military government
also assured them that the Reform would not confiscate their land or under
take major land redistribution in their region.
Indeed, Article 19 amended the 1975 proclamation to grant peasants possessory right over the land they till.
Even so, the 1975 Agrarian Reform represented a huge change in how rural lands were owned and managed. The Derg simply did not have sufficient administrative strength to implement changes. Accordingly, it turned to university students who were sent into the countryside in a Maoist-style zemecha "Development Through Cooperation Campaign" (Dejene 1987:33). Students wanted to establish communal farms "for the land-hungry peasants in the south" but also "hoped to mobilize the countryside against the military regime which they considered illegitimate" (Dejene 1987:33). Conflicts soon erupted, forcing the military government to intervene in places like Jimma (serving region 5) and in Dilla, Yirgalem and Wollamo Soddo within Sidamo (adjacent to Borana). Within a year, most students had returned to the cities and their campuses, but by mid-1976 they had achieved organization of 20,000 PAs with some 5 million households - a total which eventually grew to 23,500 PAs with perhaps 7.2 million members (Dejene 1987:34-35).
When the students came to Borana, they encountered a pastoral system where private land-holdings had not yet developed and where the Imperial administrations had ruled through a system of indirect representation, drawing elders from the two main moieties into which Boran clans are organized (Helland 1977:73). The students made the Borana indigenous madda (literally "well" or "spring") units in the basis for peasant associations, within a new hierarchy for territorial administration (Hogg 1990). Among the Borana, a madda unit "includes all people and all the animals" who used a given well complex (Helland 1977:73). Helland warns, however, that there was "no evidence" that the madda functioned to manage resources territorially, and that while the people did have a sophisticated system for managing their deep wells, madda groups "cannot deny access to pastures to any Borana .... limit the size of the Borana herds or do whatever else may be deemed necessary to manage the rangelands" (1977:74). Such restrictions are reserved for the adda, the term Borana use to describe the traditional customs all good Borana follow (Helland 1977:59).
The Derg regime did not attempt to relocate the Boran into these kebelle units (as PAs are called within Ethiopia). Instead, the people were simply registered into whichever PA was in their vicinity. PA members did get access to subsidized economic goods, such as grain and sugar, and clans began to use the PAs to buttress claims to land in the Somali areas of Region 5 (Hogg 1977:116). Among the Borana, the madda continued to operate as they usually had, but would now also contain overlapping PA officers (some of whom might be traditional elders) who dealt with the territorial administration as representatives for their area. Thus the indigenous systems for resource use co-existed with a more formalized PA system with its list of registered members and its committees. Peasant associations also became very useful as a basis for local defense during the war with the Somalis in 1977/78.
In 1979, the Derg regime issued a further directive calling for a stage-by-stage evolution of PAs into eventual producers co-operatives. As a first step, the PAs were instructed to pool their land resources; in a second step, they would combine using oxen and tools; and in a third and final step, smaller units would join to form a mechanized farm of some 4,000 ha (10,000 acres) containing about 2,000 households. At this final stage, the PA's service cooperatives would no longer be necessary.
In highland Arsi (north of Borana), Dejene found that producer co-operatives made up about 7% of rural households and cultivated 11% of the land (1987:74). Nevertheless, they got priority in the supply of inputs or services. Those visited by Dejene exhibited many problems and few benefits. Arsi's weak producers co-ops remained heavily dependent on the MOA's support. Their bad reputation became a major source of the peasant's negative attitudes towards the entire co-operative movement being promoted by Derg Officials (1987:138). Once again, since Borana was not a grain growing area, it escaped the ill-will which collectivization generated within Ethiopia's highland areas.
Instead, within Ethiopia's lowland areas, the Derg focused on the formation of service co-operatives. These were announced in 1978 as intermediaries to tie PAs to the government's recently established Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) which traded in grain and agricultural inputs under supervision of the MOA (in 1979 the AMC was transferred to the Ministry of Domestic Trade). Each service cooperative combined the economic activities of between 3 and 10 PAs; Dejene says the average was 5 (1987:66). Each PA would send three-representatives to constitute the Service Co-op's annual general assembly, which in turn elects a 10 person executive committee every two years. Under the executive, come various specialized subcommittees (for finance, purchasing, and education). Peasants would thus become indirect members of any service co-op formed to which their PA was attached. In addition to some mandated grain trading (in the grain producing areas), the service co-op supplied agricultural inputs like fertilizers, improved seeds, and pesticides, and ran its own shop carrying salt, sugar, cooking oil, soap and simple consumer goods for its members (Dejene 1987:66-67). For these latter items, co-ops dealt with the Ethiopian Domestic Distribution Corporation (EDDC), which supplied consumer goods to cities as well as to the rural sector. Obviously, then, the Derg was creating a parallel system for trading which would have eliminated private traders entirely had the regime achieved its policy objectives.
With regard specifically to Ethiopia's lowland pastoralists (mainly the Afars, Somalis, and Boran peoples), the Derg regime inherited two major technical assistance projects planned by the FAO and LMD staff and implemented under World Bank funding. The first, known as the Second Livestock Development Project, provided US $5 million towards improvements in a proposed national network of stock routes. (Conceptually, it was very similar to the marketing component in Kenya's KLDP phase 2 project under implementation at this same time.) Three main stock routes were identified, by map rather than through local consultations (Desta 1993:46). One led from the NE rangelands to Asmara, another from the Jijiga lowlands to the railhead at Dire Dawa, and a third from the southern rangelands linking northwards to Shewa Province. Along these routes, which were meant to tie existing centers of traditional pastoralism to emerging markets for beef cattle, would be constructed stock-route facilities and market-places. The 1977 Ethio-Somali War destroyed most of what had been built, and, in any case, the mapped routes were purely hypothetical without much connection to where existing animals moved between lowland and highland areas. As Desta concludes, the Project (1973-81) "was never completed" because of poor management and cost overruns, and yielded "no significant impact" (1963:46).
While the SLDP was already launched at the time of the 1974 revolution, a much more ambitious and larger Third Livestock Development Project (TLDP) was also in final stages of preparation drawing upon FAO and World Bank staff working once again with the Livestock and Marketing Board. This time, the Project had as its specific focus Ethiopia's pastoral areas, each given its "development unit" on the ground to act as an executing agency. The Southern Rangelands Development Unit (or SORDU) is the one of most direct interest here, since it covered the 90,000 square kilometer area occupied by Borana pastoralists (from Mega southwards to the Kenya border). Then there was the Jijiga Rangelands Development Unit (JIRDU), covering 33,000 square kilometers within the much larger Somali lowlands of the southeast, and the North-East Rangelands Development Unit (NERDU) covering 75,000 square kilometers among Afar pastoralists to the northeast. The total project cost was set at US $43 million, with $27 million from IDA funds, $5.5 million from the African Development fund, and roughly $10 million from Ethiopia's own contributions (Desta 1993:46). The project, begun in 1976, was supposed to have ended in 1981 but because of the Ethio-Somali War was extended, to mid-1983 for NERDU and JIRDU and to mid-1984 for SORDU.
SORDU's field headquarters at Yavello served six districts (Woreda), and grew into a substantial complex of offices, workshops and staff housing. Its structure was divided into three tiers: six staff functions (audit, finance, etc.) which jointly supervised five main technical sections (for co-operative development, animal health, range development, marketing, and infrastructure) each with between 2-3 units (or programs). (Today the Project Manager has 295 staff but hardly any field budget, see our following section on the post-Derg policies.) A quick review of SORDU's main services offered within its project area includes: veterinary treatment (nearly 8 million animals treated); vaccinations (16 million innoculated against CBP or Rinderpest); 9 dipping vats serving 5 woreda; pond construction (880 stock ponds up to 1996); deep well improvement (43 dug out); experiments on bush control (none as successful as fire-using, banned by the Government); road maintenance over a network of bush tracks linking the six Woredas; three fattening ranches, 2 of which failed and were turned back to local communities; and the creation of functioning service co-operatives with livestock drugs, grain supplies, and consumer shops (5 of 6 in operation). All in all, the SORDU manager tries to support thirteen field programs. (These figures come from the1998 SORDU Project Manager.)
A formal listing of the Third Livestock Development Projects total achievements
between 1976 and 1986 is given in Table 3 overleaf. At least in comparison
to its equivalent units, JIRDU and NERDU, the SORDU field team appears
to have been moderately successful. Only one component of the larger project
was never implemented, the Awassa feedlot programme - because of a failure
of its associated company (Desta 1993:47). Hogg (1997:15 fn) cites the
World Bank's own (1991) completion report to the effect the Ethiopia "received
little benefit in terms of increased livestock productivity, off-take or
improved range resources" from these three, interlinked range development
projects making up the TLDP. Desta notes a failure of ILCA to disseminate
its linked research studies on SORDU, and the underuse of the $1.4 million
allocated for staff development and training (1993:47). Compared with East
Africa's other projects of the period, it seems almost incredible that
only 5 project staff attended post graduate training, and only 14 participated
in short courses or study tours (1993:47). He concludes that overall the
project was overly ambitious: a complete change in production attitudes
and practices was expected in too short a time.
SOURCE: Girma Bisrat (1987) Range Development and Research
Proposal. In Proceedings of the First National Livestock Improvement
Conference, 11-13 February 1987. Addis Ababa, Institute of Agricultural
Research, p. 181.
When SORDU's official World Bank support ended in June, 1984, Ethiopia was in the midst of another major drought afflicting its northern lands. While Mengistu had consolidated his power within the Derg, his opponents now established liberation movements with support from outside Ethiopia's borders. In 1984-85, the Derg mounted a major resettlement and villagization program aimed at resettling drought-afflicted families from the north into better watered southern lands. Perhaps half a million people were shifted to live in compact and geometrically laid out villages (Goyder & Goyder 1988:103). In such settlements, government control became much easier, farmers could not conceal grain from the AMC, and liberation movements could be kept out. In fact, Mengistu had very specific and largely political objectives in mind for what was an immensely ambitious program (Giorgis 1989:288-292). By September 1986 Mengistu announced that 10% of Ethiopians, over four million people, were living in villages. Because of the many private costs associated with mass relocations, people resented the loss of their former independence even if their new homes were in less stressed areas.
It is an oversimplification to say that similar tactics were not considered for the pastoral areas further south, where the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) became increasingly active. Dawit Wolde Giorgis tells of one attempt by the RCC to get destitute Somali nomads to settle along the Shebelle River (1989:282-84). At that time, the RCC was responsible for some 40,000 Somali ex-nomads who had spent two years in temporary camps. Dawitt decided the Wabi Shebelli's valley could allow the whole group to be resettled into irrigation-based farming communities. He admits, "I assumed that they would readily accept the idea" (p. 282), but found instead: "They asked lots of questions, some of them very odd..." Finally he took representatives by air to view the proposed site - a horrifying experience for the mainly old refugees selected. After a two day site visit, Dawit spent three days preparing the Somalis for their transfer. One hundred trucks were readied for the first day's move. However (1989:284):
Early in the morning, some of the drivers who had been sleeping in their
trucks near the shelters came rushing up to me in absolute shock. The camp
was deserted. The tukuls had been quickly and silently dismantled
and over 10,500 people had vanished... We later learned they had crossed
the border into Somalia.
Desta's reference cited above to the poor communication of ILCA's SORDU-linked research studies requires further comment. ILCA had wanted to locate its arid and semi-arid "systems study" within Ethiopia. It began a field program with this objective in 1975. The initial study involved 17 researchers, focusing on land use near Jijiga above Ethiopia's eastern Somali lowlands. The 1977 Ethio-Somali War forced a relocation of effort to the Afar's deserts in the NERDU territory. (It, too, had been abandoned by 1982 for security reasons.) Finally, in 1981, agreement was reached with the World Bank for a jointly funded research program looking at SORDU's activities in the Southern Rangelands, but also carrying out ILCA's main research effort on Boran pastoral productivity. Called the Joint Ethiopian Pastoral Systems Study (or JEPSS), this 1981-84 effort resulted in 12 research reports and 13 monographs, but no synthesis (a task eventually completed for ILCA by Coppock).
Meanwhile, Ethiopia became convulsed in another major drought which brought international attention and the inevitable questions why a large CGIAR center had nothing positive to offer to assist Ethiopia's suffering pastoralists. (Webb & von Braun estimate Ethiopia had over three million pastoralists, upon whom ILCA had already spent US $3.3 million by 1981.) Indeed, the International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA) was itself an anamoly within socialist Ethiopia. Agreed with the previous Imperial Govenment, ILCA became the CGIAR's major complex for studying African livestock, matching a sister institution, ILRAD, to study African livestock diseases. By the time ILCA was completed, however, it found itself conducting its two Ethiopian-based systems studies, on the highlands and on the arid and semi-arid zone, within a radical Marxist regime not noted for attention to scientific inquiry. ILCA's Director General was determined his new institution could contribute more than mere basic research to Ethiopia's rapidly evolving production systems.
The JEPSS studies showed calf nutrition was a key constraint limiting Boran productivity. In 1985, ILCA persuaded CARE to embark on a follow-up program carrying ILCA's scientific work into actual application. Thus was born CARE's Southern Sidamo Rangeland Development Project, headquartered in Yavello within what had been a food relief compound. Hogg (1992) gives us a fairly detailed description of CARE's Borana project (supplemented by field interviews in early 1998 at site in Yavello).
CARE's Borana program had the usual ambitious objectives: 1) to facilitate pastoralists' abilities to identify problems and solutions; 2) to strengthen the linkages between communities through pastoral associations and service co-operatives; and 3) to provide technical advice, materials and training in support of local solutions to the food security problem (Hogg 1992 citing CARE documents). What it did in practice was to search out small-scale incremental changes people could adopt if given small amounts of external assistance.
It tried a long list of potential innovations: well upgrading, pond desilting using animal-drawn scoops, cement cisterns and water catchments, haymaking, camel transport of water, below ground grain stores, credit for hand tools, even handicraft sales during times of emergencies. Some proved valuable and spread quickly. Others evidenced unsuspected technical problems and had to be abondoned. Obviously, in restrospect, CARE provided an essential "adaptive research" function to ILCA's distant scientists, and one which private service providers could not duplicate without going bankrupt. If the program had a major weakness, it was its dependence for funds on donor supplied grain sales, whose profits in Birr were then passed on to NGOs like CARE.
Hogg (1992:128-130) criticizes CARE for adopting a hierarchical project organization, complete with in expatriate project manager and a small cluster of offices and stores. He also argues CARE showed little direct cooperation with the government, and did not document its impacts through on-going monitoring. His larger criticisms, that CARE gave no attention to the problem of bush encroachment facing pastoralists and that it disregarded pastoral systemic linkages are accurate but unfair. A prohibition on burning has been an Ethiopian government policy since perhaps Imperial days. And no organization, not even ILCA, has paid attention to the socio-economic systems within which the Boran, Gabbra, and Garri households must operate when trying to safeguard sustainable livelihoods.
Alongside CARE's expanded activities in Borana came a major reorganization of Ethiopia's territorial administration following the establishment of Ethiopia as a "Peoples' Democratic Republic" in 1987. Ethiopia was divided into 30 regions, in which now Borana became a single unit (combining two former Awradjas) coupled with an upgrading of the quality of administrative staff. For the first time, ethnic Boranas assumed leadership positions in both the administration and the party (Helland et al. 1997:39). (This major territorial reorganization was still being implemented when the EPRDF victory in Addis Ababa brought the Derg government to an end.
The regime kept SORDU in operation using Ethiopian funds pending a possible new project by World Bank. However, in World Bank the old-style range development projects were being phased out while Bank officials debated the merits of projects based on pastoral associations (de Haan 1994). Finally, in 1988 the Bank with some reluctance incorporated a small (US $5 million) "pilot" component for SORDU within its mainly highlands oriented Fourth Livestock Development Project (Desta 1993:58). SORDU's administrative structure was reorganized into basically its present form (described above), while incorporating a monitoring and evaluation section into its range management activities and changing its main focus to be upon establishing effective service co-operatives run by pastoral communities themselves. Richard Hogg became SORDU's main external advisor, taking up residence in Yavello. There was much more focus on involving both SORDU staff and local beneficiaries within a collaborative mode of work. The Pilot Project's main official objective became "sustainability, participation of beneficiaries, and utilization of pastoralist social organization" (Desta 1993:48).
At the international level, the popular outcry in the UK and USA over a failure to assist Ethiopia's northern regions during the long 1982-86 drought had forced donors to deal with the Mengistu regime despite strong disapproval of Mengistu's policies. It also made apparent the futility of reacting to such a major catastrophe on a country-by-country basis. The drought afflicted the entire region: Sudan, Eritrea (then at war for its independence from Ethiopia), Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya. In early 1986, these countries joined by Uganda (Eritrea did not officially enter until 1993) formed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), with its headquarters in Djibouti.
These seven states form a contiguous block where pastoralists often move across borders and whose lowlands often experience famine simultaneously. In 1991, it was estimated by the UN Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa (SEPHA) that the region contained 9 million refugees and displaced people (Markakis 1998:16). Its poorest states were also highly dependent on food imports to meet staple food needs. In 1989, the dependency ratios of food imports to total food production was for Sudan 28%, for Djibouti 100%, for Eritrea 70%, for Somalia 28%, and for Ethiopia 26%. This contrasts with 6% for Kenya (Markakis 1998:85).
IGADD's executive is constituted of the Heads of State from its member countries. IGADD's Executive Secretary serves a four year term (once renewable) and reports to its council of Ministers. The poverty of IGADD's member states gives it virtually no reliable funds of its own. Instead, it looks to donors for support of its many infrastructural projects, a combined "wish list" from all its member states. In 1990, just prior to Mengistu's fall, IGADD approved a food strategy for the region, giving priority to four areas: 1) increasing local food production, 2) better food marketing, 3) increased food consumption, and 4) better food policy management. It also established with donor support a region-wide famine early warning system (see Markakis 1998:158). These developments explained USAID's own Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) still in formative stages as of mid-1998. On the Horn of Africa generally, Markakis (1998) book Resource Conflict in the Horn of Africa constitutes a useful starting source.
For the Horn of Africa's pastoralists, the collapse of Siyad Barre's
regime in early 1991 and Mengistu's removal only a few months later were
crucial events (see Lewis 1994:221-34 on Somalia and Jalata 1993:178-81
on Ethiopia). The truth is that in both regimes the leader at the top was
his nation's one key "policy-maker". Barre's and Mengistu's tortuous attempts
to retain complete military and political control were what in the last
analysis was driving each regime's "policy choices." Here Dawit Wolde Giorgis'
insider's account Red Tears (1989) remains mandatory reading for
anyone who wishes to understand how Mengistu's policies were actually derived.
The Liberalization Policies (1991-98)
The fall of Mengistu's regime in May of 1991, followed by establishment of a Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) under Meles Zenawi liberalized Ethiopia in profound ways. It opened the door to regionalism that had been growing throughout the 1980s, confirmed in a TGE proclamation in 1992. It launched in October of 1992 a major economic reform program, devaluing the currency (to US $1 = 5 birr) and deregulating agricultural marketing. In April of 1993, it allowed the referendum which gave Eritrea its long-sought independence. In 1994, a new constitution was approved, and in May of 1995 national and regional elections installed the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Maxwell et al. 1996:21). These were all momentous changes, restoring democracy and reversing fifteen years of Derg imposed socialism. There were also immensely popular policy changes within Ethiopia, whose people had become exhausted by years of famine and fighting under a repressive Marxist regime.
Nevertheless, this happy situation was not immediately welcomed along Ethiopia's southern borders. Two key factors overshadowed the initial acceptance of the TGE in Borana (the area of concern in this study). First, whereas the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) initially supported the EPRDF victory in Addis Ababa, by June of 1992 it withdrew from Ethiopia's State Council and reverted to being the TEG's local opponent in the south. The Derg's support of SORDU and its recruitment of the first educated Boran generation into the governing elite gave the Mengistu regime considerable legitimacy within Borana. Borana did not share in the Derg's highly unpopular villagization. All in all, this left the southern elite within Borana very uncertain what to do when the EPRDF overthrew Mengistu far more quickly than anyone expected.
A second key factor was the collapse of the Somali regime, sending waves of destitute refugees fleeing across borders into Ethiopia and Kenya once again. The author was told in Borana (in early 1998) that by 1992 the local consensus was that Ethiopia was about to follow Somolia into disorganized chaos. (Remember that several of the liberation movements were still demanding eventual partition of Ethiopia.) We were shown to confirm this opinion a rural school near Yavello where the local peasants looted its timbers and roofing sheets because they expected the civil regime was about to disintegrate.
Elders near Beke pond (constructed as part of USAID's 1960s pilot ranching scheme) decided they must reassert ancient land claims by killing or driving off the Gabbra immigrants whom the Derg regime had settled there after the 1977 war with Somolia (Webb & von Braun 1994:88). (After the 1977 war, the Derg regime avoided returning Gabbra to their traditional areas but instead scattered them in small clusters within the heart of Borana.) With the collapse of the Mengistu government, Boran elders felt this was their last chance to rectify a policy they had opposed. Similar mix-ups, whether deliberate or not, had characterized the return of Garri pastoralists from refugee camps in Somalia in the late 1980s. As Getachew notes (1996:118):
For example, Garri Marrehan and Gijji returnees settlements were established
in Boran territories (near Arero and El-Gofa, and in Liban) while Gabra,
Arssi and Gurra families were located in Gijji areas. Given the past conflicts
over grazing and water rights, this kind of insensitive mixing up of population
groups against their will was unlikely to result in the emergence of harmonious
neighbourhoods.
In a foot note, Getachew adds: "Since 1992 it has been a direct cause of bitter disputes. Hundreds of people have been killed."
Futterknech's account makes it clear outsiders have underplayed the true extent of the violence and famine at this time. Private trading collapsed, for both grains and livestock. There was a great exodus of Borana families, some going across the border to register in Kenyan refugee camps, others to the towns to search for work. 160,000 were receiving food rations. Others took up weapons, and attacked the Guji for cattle. When the drought finally broke in April-May of 1992, the cattle died from sickness and sheer exhaustion. It was estimated that the Borana lost 70% of their cattle herds, and maybe 80% of the total livestock. Finally, though, peace talks were organized locally and the fighting stopped. December of 1992 brought unexpected rains, converting the dusty landscape into green meadows. The returnees began filtering back from their camps in Kenya (Futterknech 1997:170-176). In Yavello, a Peace and Stability Committee representing both town elders and Boran elders intervened to bring the looting to an end (Futterknech 1997:172). Soon SORDU was again re-opening the overgrown bush tracks so that famine relief could be delivered to the more remote communities, and normal life recommenced.
After the drought, a major activity of all NGOs working in Borana (and of SORDU) was the administration of temporary "food-for-work" campaigns. Food-for-work is the local expression of the World Food Program's national assistance to drought-afflicted countries. Under this program, destitute families (often women left behind by absent husbands) receive grain rations in return for specified project labor. FFW activities were manual bush clearing, road maintenance, pond construction, and well maintenance. Food handouts not requiring work were provided for a time by the UNHCR (with an office in Moyale), the RRC, The Ethiopian Red Cross, CARE, and a local self-help association among the Boran (Urstad 1997:125). A preference among NGOs for the "food-for-work" format can be linked to the fact this program provides employment, injects food into remote communities where markets are severely constrained, and can introduce necessary technical innovations people might not construct individually.
Nevertheless, it has contributed to a reactivated polarity between Boran households, who by 1998 had returned to isolated homesteads spread across the rangelands, and the predominantly Gabbra and Garri households depending on firewood collection and milk-selling to nearby towns. The latter groups sometimes still received "food-for-work" through church organizations, and constitute a socially invisible underclass present in substantial numbers along the main roads throughout Borana. (Encouraging these people to grow maize, as was being done in 1998, virtually guarantees another food crisis as soon as drought years return.)
To fully understand the emergent Borana socio-economic system, one must therefore see its residents both as viewed by the dominant Boran (here see Bassi 1997) and by the returnee's own stories (here read Getachew 1996). According to Bassi's figures (1997:38-39), while Moyale district in 1984 had a population of 27,000, by 1993 it population had climbed to over 130,000. In one single program (out of several), the UNHCR moved 44,000 Somali returnees from its camp in Kenya back across the border into the Somali portions of Ethiopia's Moyale area. Indeed, there was an on-going struggle for dominance between Region 5 and Region 4 (with separate parties and flags) right within Moyale town during our visit in 1998.
Facing such immediate pressures, local officials in 1998 did not seem much concerned about national policy measures such as privatization or structural adjustment. Ethiopia had made significant strides in market liberalization, as we shall see below. However, at the local level the main tension arises because of the continuing uncertainty within SORDU how its field administration will fit into the new structure of regional governments. For several years, SORDU has received only the bare minimum needed to pay staff salaries on a reduced basis. Its officials were told they had been transferred to the Oromiya state government as from 1994/95, and had been visited by an Oromiya team preparing the state government's submission to the ADB for new project funding. However, the SORDU staff felt the state government was mainly interested in creating infrastructure - a message the NGOs also received - and does not put priority on the organizational and technical innovations which SORDU and CARE have worked so hard to establish. Meanwhile, during our visit the Oromiya administration announced it would be rehabilitating a research ranch within the older "pilot project" area outside Yavello.
Ngelle's Save the Children Fund office has emphasized food security and child survival, constructing ponds with community labor, clearing the bush with "food-for-work" and financing revolving drug accounts which SORDU supervised when assisting community-based veterinary workers. Recently, Save the Children Fund had secured a USAID commitment for assistance up to 2001 based on local payments for edible food oil. However, Save the Children's officials said the people's own priority is for a better dispersal of water supplies. The town relies on a SORDU maintained dam (or "pond") for its water. There was also consensus that SORDU had not used the drugs Save the Children Fund had supplied wisely. Many became out of date, there was confusion over pricing, and poor record-keeping meant that community funds were soon exhausted.
Ngelle's main preoccupation in 1998 was with its new zonal offices and a desire for repairs of the main road linking it to the highlands (destroyed by tanks in the 1977 War and never rebuilt). GTZ had just launched a new "Borana Lowland Pastoral Development Program" for three nearby Woredas supported by a small team in Ngelle. The new Borana Project was just formulating its program of work in early 1998, too soon to specify what it would be doing or how it would interface with SORDU.
Local and national interests over reform do coincide in regard to Borana's nearly defunct veterinary clinics (run by SORDU on a maintenance basis). Under its liberalization program, the Ethiopian government has decided to encourage veterinarians to enter private practice. There is a Veterinary Privatization Promotion Office in the Addis Ababa MOA. The question remains whether this is feasible for places like Borana.
Mussa and Gavian (1995) point out that Ethiopia has sub-Saharan Africa's largest livestock population (an estimated 31 million cattle), but only 324 veterinarians nationally. Borana's importance to adjacent highlands is the threat of transmittable diseases - introducing a significant externality associated with protective measures. Of special concern are rinderpest and tick-borne diseases. With rinderpest, mortalities in non-endemic areas can be as high as 90%, contrasting with about 10% in endemic herds (Mussa & Gavian 1995:299). A major vaccination program has been supported by various donors and implemented through the OAU, and Pan African Rinderpest Campaign (PARC). During 1988-92, almost 39 million animals were vaccinated, costing 7.5 million Birr. Tick-borne diseases, too, are a major concern in Borana (the top problem in a PRA survey done by GTZ near Ngelle during our visit). Benefits will not be fully realized unless all local owners participate - not likely under a fee-based private veterinary service.
Under a new policy, some senior veterinarians have left government employ to open private clinics. We visited one flourishing veterinary drug retail shop in Mega, whose owner has started a second shop in Moyale. Thus private provision of veterinary drugs is definitely feasible, even at low states of commercialization. Less certain is whether poorly trained paraprofessionals can take over the functions of SORDU's moribund public clinics. CARE officials told us that in their experience, about half of the "veterinary scouts" trained soon drop out, but others remain active in their home communities. Pastoral areas probably require a mixed and "well tailored" combination of public and private practitioners (Mussa & Gaui 1995:307). Curative services for non-fectious diseases can be privately treated, but control of endemic infectious diseases will also require a public presence.
Ethiopia's unfolding national reforms are summarized in a masterful report by Maxwell et al. on EU aid to Ethiopia (IDS 1996) and analyzed in numerous papers from four successive Ethiopian Economics Association conferences during 1993-96. All have been published in Ethiopia as books: Privatization and Public Enterprize Reform in Ethiopia (Kello 1994), Ethiopian Agriculture: Problems of Transformation (Aredo & Demeke 1995), Adjustment in Ethiopia (Abadi & Alemu 1996), and The Ethiopian Economy, Poverty and Poverty Alleviation (Kebede & Taddesse 1996). Also relevant is a special 1995 issue of the Ethiopian Journal of Development Research on "Land Rights and Access to Land in Post-Derg Ethiopia" (vol 17, no. 1). These reports are a credit to the dedication of Ethiopia's scholars.
The liberalization of Ethiopia's command economy actually began during the Mengistu regime, once Gorbachov began to distance his government from further assistance to Ethiopia. There was a partial reform of agricultural marketing in 1988, and then a much more complete set of changes announced as the New Economic Policy in March of 1990. These reforms abolished grain quotas and fixed grain prices, lifted controls on interregional grain marketing, and legalized private grain trading - all changes with direct and far-reaching effects in the more remote pastoral areas. Indeed Maxwell and Alemayehu summarize several phases of increasingly more drastic reforms (IDS 1996:23) reproduced as Table 4.
Other than the initial liberalization of grain trading, perhaps the
most urgent need was for the Ethiopian government to divest itself of numerous
loss-making SOEs. Eventually, in 1994 (by Proclamation 87) an Ethiopian
Privatization Agency (EPA) was established, reporting directly to the Prime
Minister. As Assibe notes (1996:187), in 1991 Ethiopia had 243 public enterprizes
with a work force of 210,949 (note the general similarity to Kenya at this
time). Also like Kenya, by 1989/90 the overall government deficit had reached
17% of GDP. Initially, the EPA focused on the small directly commercial
enterprises which made up about 80% of the 197 SOEs targeted for privatization
in the first phase. A substantial number were privatized by worker buy-outs.
Within its first year, the EPA had sold 75% of the retail shops, 43% of
the hotels and 71% of the industrial establishments on its list. However,
these were relatively easy cases (merely reversing the Derg's earlier nationalisations),
and only 10 agricultural businesses were found among the 130 enterprises
the EPA handled in its first year (Assible 1996).
Adapted from Simon Maxwell, et al. (1996) An Evaluation
of Development Cooperation between the European Union and Ethiopia, 1976-1994.
Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex/Addis
Ababa: Institute of Development Research, Addis Ababa University, p. 23.
Equally obvious candidates for privatization were Ethiopia's state farms and ranches, run by the former Ministry of State Farms Development. This one agency had over 44,000 employees (Kebede 1994:209). Virtually all Ethiopia's state farms had run at losses from their inception. In the livestock sector, the LMC's enterprises had lost an average of 13 million Birr annually. The whole state farms sector was losing on average annually 75 million Birr (Ayana 1993:47). Thus privatizing these enterprises meant simply shedding unviable investments that should have been closed years earlier.
It is not so clear what should be done about other, high profile SOEs which donors would like to see handed over to private ownership. A case in point is the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE). The CBE is one of Ethiopia's successes, having returned regular profits to the Derg regime year after year. The meant, however, it did not increase its net worth despite impressive growth. In 1994, 56% of the CBE's total assets were liabilities, with only just over 1% from its own capital (Zeidy 1996:117). At that time, its current liabilities exceeded assets by nearly 10 billion Birr. Funds from current deposits go towards mostly long-term investments, while a large share of current profits is still returned to the central treasury.
What to do about the CBE is particular and rural finance in general remains a thorny question in Ethiopia. As Zeidy shows, Ethiopia "is one of the most under-banked countries in SSA" (1996:109). Ethiopia has only about 3 operating bank branches per million inhabitants, against a SSA average of 10 - and the SSA average is the lowest in the world. Most financial sevices to small and micro-enterprises originate from the informal sector. This leaves the CBE and two recently formed rivals, the Development Bank of Ethiopia and the Construction and Business Bank, to service Ethiopia's large enterprises and foreign businesses. Perhaps the desire to prove its relevance towards small entrepreneurs explains why the CBE keeps it branches at Ngelle, Yavello, and Moyale open (all within Borana), despite minuscule local lending and deposits.
The more complete economic reforms adopted by the Transitional Government (TGE) after 1991 had an initial phase of stabilisation followed by thorough going structural measures (Kabede 1994). The currency was devalued (October 1992) and regular currency auctions commenced (May 1993). Interest rates were adjusted, SOE subsidies lifted, and a donor-financed Economic Recovery and Rehabilitation Program negotiated to give stop-gap financing for materials and parts. By 1995, there was a revised investment law, revised labor laws to "enhance" labor discipline, removal of transport tariffs, and lifting of most export taxes except for coffee. A third phase still underway was envisioned to include decentralized governance and streamlined administrative procedures. Kabede (1994) outlines a complex structure to administer these sweeping reforms. Whether they will increase efficiency is unlikely.
Our extended review of Ethiopia's three successive policy regimes towards pastoralists has said little about the technical interventions we usually associate with livestock policy. As with Hogg (1993) and Fekade (1995:282), this author finds that pastoral components are largely absent from Ethiopian decision-making, public or private. Policies there have been, of immense significance to Boran pastoralists: villagization, controlled grain trading, the establishment of service co-operatives, the maintenance of peace, and official actions towards refugees and disaster relief. While all important, these were not specifically directed at livestock improvement per se. Here the presence of SORDU as Borana's only agency with some residual technical capacity poses the present regime with a key policy choice. Its high replacement costs (to create an alternate service delivery system) and its strategic present links to all six woreda all suggest it should be retained as the basis for future service delivery. But such a decision would contradict the general policy of promoting private service providers.
Similarly, the absence within Ethiopia of effective agro-pastoral technical packages means that the mainline system for agricultural extension has few messages relevant to pastoralists. For the present, either the GTZ project in Ngelle or at a greater distance ILRI's scientists remain the de facto suppliers of livestock advice to the Borana system. Perhaps in future Alemaya or Awasa's universities could take on this role; at present, they lack the necessary technical capacity (because of inadequate staffing for Awassa and distance for Alemaya). Thus whether the GRZ continues to work in Botana and whether the ILRI continues to support livestock policy research matters a great deal. For poor and remote pastoralists like the Borana, then, policy choices must be conditioned to suit available organizational competencies.
As for Ethiopia's future policies, we were told the Prime Minister himself had directed the regional agricultural bureaus to find technical packages suited to pastoral needs. (An Ethiopian consultant was said to be drafting just such a package in early 1998.) There were plans underway to upgrade Awassa Agricultural College (the campus nearest to Borana) into a new University for the Southern Region. The Oromia state government has established its own office to coordinate agricultural research. The IAR was being reconstituted into the Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organization (EARO) with an expanded mandate. There were preparations for a huge tsetse sterilization project, targeting the Rift Valley lowlands adjacent to Borana's western border.
The most dramatic possibility is that the ABD will have funded a US $40 million National Livestock Development Program (NLDP) similar to Ethiopia's earlier, nonperforming livestock loans. Aimed at improving livestock production and animal health, this project would revive six breeding ranches (some in Borana), establish a national artificial insemination service, stimulate feed production, and strengthen program management . Under this latter US $2.3 million component would be support to Ethiopia's hard-pressed zonal coordinators, installation of computerized financial monitoring, and increased technical support. In short, the ABD proposal if approved gives some external assistance to many of the MOA's long-suffering senior officials and to their counterparts in the state governments.
The truth remains that any regime as poor as Ethiopia's is bound to
adjust its policies to suit donor's willingness to invest. The Rift Valley
tsetse sterilization project and the NLDP occur only because donors want
them funded. For now (assuming peace returns), we can expect most other
initiatives will concern either safeguarding Ethiopia's food security,
or weaning its local agencies from disaster relief. Such policies do open
the door for greater participation by regional bodies like IGADD, the OAU,
the UNDP, or ILRI itself. They will not, nevertheless, substitute for Ethiopia
devising more effective strategies aimed at creating sustainable pastoral
livelihoods.
Similarities
Looking back at the many interventions which governments, donors, and
NGOs have sponsored towards pastoralists over the past, say, thirty years,
we see certain common features that were characteristic within both Ethiopia
and Kenya:
• Most earlier programs took untried technical interventions as their
basis. When the promised benefits did not materialize, the programs soon
became discredited among pastoralists even though the government sometimes
persisted with unpopular interventions for years.
• A major reason for the low pay-off was that technical interventions had been developed in elite production environments or on research stations. Under local, high challenge conditions, these technical packages did not perform well - indeed local practices often out-performed the innovations scientists recommended (Moris 1988, 1991: 24-30).
• Planners typically relied upon optimistic output and off-take projections,
far above what existing field units were achieving. One must wonder, then,
who should be blamed for the subsequent poor performance of donor-financed
livestock sector loans: field agencies or the donor's planners?
• In both Ethiopia and Kenya, the World Bank's initial livestock projects
were designed to fit within a nationally-integrated meat industry. This
created many components within a "top-down" network of interdependent investments.
A failure of one component would reduce or negate performance from other
components. Of course, such national interdependencies were a characteristic
of many donor-assisted livestock programs throughout Africa in the 1960s
and early 1970s.
• The kinds of programs adopted for pastoral development thus reflected
what was in fashion among donors at a particular period. Very broadly,
we can distinguish four generations, with somewhat different implementing
procedures:
1950s - First generation: Colonial officers impose statutory grazing
blocks coupled with improved veterinary assistance and campaigns to control
livestock diseases.
1960s - Second generation: UNDP and USAID fund pilot rangeland projects,
with an emphasis upon range planning, water development, stock routes and
offtake quotas. The UNDP Funds numerous field studies and stock counts
in the early 1970s. The main goal is to increase commercialized beef sales
through creation of individual pilot ranches.
1970s - Third generation: Donor projects continue as before, but add
sociology and pastoral associations as components within livestock development,
also attempt to establish breeding ranches and (sometimes) better livestock
marketing. The World Bank takes over as the main supporter of pastoral
projects (de Haan 1994). Multidonor projects coordinated by the Bank and
its partners become the norm. The focus is on "rangeland development projects."
1980s - Livestock projects fall out of favor with bilateral donors because
of their poor repayment record. Most larger projects are terminated when
funding ends or are handed over to the MOA without further support.
Ethiopia adds new range projects under World Bank and ADB (contrary
to the general trend elsewhere). ILCA and IPAL conduct major, multidisciplinary
studies in Borana and Marsabit to guide future interventions.
1990s - Fourth generation: Small-scale projects assist drought-afflicted
pastoralists and emphasize restocking, women's projects, goats and camels,
with NGOs as the main support agencies. Funding consists of micro-finance
for revolving funds operated by local groups. Diagnosis is based on PRA.
• Our usual view of policy choices leading to projects mistates the
East African situation in the 1970s. What one saw instead were project-driven
policy choices, where one must infer implied policy conditionalities to
accompany donor designed projects. Often this was how donors used their
project investments, making them instruments for leverage to achieve donor-chosen
policy objectives--and, of course, causing numerous delays when the national
regimes baulked at the required policy changes.
• Similarly, the main bodies of technical knowledge about pastoral areas
were not generated within the Ministries of Agriculture, but instead were
created by multidisciplinary field teams (from ILCA in Ethiopia and from
the IPAL project in Kenya). In neither were technical reports adequately
disseminated to users at the time of their compilation. For Ethiopia's
Borana system, this gap has been remedied by ILRI's publication of Coppock's
synthesis report; no such volume exists at present for the Kenyan studies.
(For a description of the UNESCO-IPAL project's activities see Lusigi 1986
and Oba 1992.)
• In both countries, initial attempts to encourage commercialized sales
among pastoralists were vested in parastatal marketing organizations. As
we have seen, Kenya had its Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) and a linked supply
organization, the MOA's Livestock Marketing Division. In Ethiopia, too,
the government established a Livestock and Meat Board (LMB) in 1964 which
in 1978 was merged into the Ministry of Agriculture (Desta 1993:46), The
situation today is similar in both countries. Neither now collects livestock
marketing statistics other than the records at slaughter houses. In each
case, the government has holding grounds and defunct stock routes which
it seeks to privatize or hand over to local control.
• Thus in both countries the current regimes have inherited a decaying
infrastructure developed originally to serve the multi-sectoral rangeland
projects of the early 1980s. The support and future of SORDU in Ethiopia
is especially important for Borana's continued development (see comments
below), while at Marsabit the EU has now agreed to support KARI's research
station (formerly the IPAL project). How to integrate a set of parallel
research and service activities within the government's mainline administration
for pastoral areas is still a major issue for both Ethiopia and Kenya.
• Both countries have been forced to rely upon disaster relief as a
major source of assistance and investment for pastoral areas. Both countries
have stated their goal to transform relief into capacity-building. However,
we know relatively little about how to transform emergency assistance into
effective long-term development investment. As a consequence, this could
be an area for shared experience and analysis between Ethiopia and Kenya
(and other states in the Horn of Africa).
• Both countries have made a commitment to privatization at the national
level. However, the reality is that this commitment will not deliver actual
benefits unless carefully tailored to local institutions and circumstances
within pastoral areas. Indeed, donor-recommended structural adjustment
measures in the short run may threaten the very service infrastructure
upon which pastoralists depend. SAP policies ignore the very low levels
of infrastructural investment found in Ethiopia and Kenya's remote pastoral
areas. Pastoral communities probably require a different application of
structural adjustment policies from the better-endowed highlands. In turn,
this means acquiring better information about local contexts - a major
reason for the writing of this report (see Appendices 3 and 4).
Because (as already indicated) both Ethiopia and Kenya were mid-way in making major changes to their livestock policies and even the structure of their administration in 1998, it was not feasible to outline in detail how each regime adopts new policies. (A useful background paper by Keeley and Scoones attempts to do this for Ethiopia's environmental policy-making process, however.) Nevertheless, certain obvious differences are apparent between how policy formulation and documentation are approached in the two countries at the national level:
ETHIOPIA
Official policies are approved by the cabinet and by elected representatives.
Policies are often under review for a long period before final adoption.
Policies are usually published as proclamations, issued in the government's
gazette in both Amharic and English.
Major policies are approved by the Council of Ministers, and are usually
very general and idealistic, e.g. Ethiopia's National Health Policy of
Sept. 1993 which articulates 10 principles such as:
"Democratization and decentralization of the health
system"
The regime prefers to rely upon senior Ethiopian consultants and not
donors to draft policies. The draft documents may be quite sensitive.
Local workshops held by Ethiopian professional associations often raise
new topics for policy consideration. The annual proceedings are important
policy sources.
There is an office to promote privatization within the Ministry of Agriculture,
a policy to which the government is openly committed.
There is much uncertainty over which policies from previous regimes
are still in effect.
The structure of the government is (in 1998) under constant change,
with ministries being aggregated and disaggregated frequently.
Policies are used for hortatory and mobilizing purposes, rather than
for stating explicit investment commitments.
Average citizens are often unsure what the government intends, and often
hedge their bets in domains which might be affected by changes in policy.
KENYA
Official policies are issued usually by the ministry concerned, except
for major initiatives announced in sessional papers or the National Plan.
There is a formal structure for decision-making, but key decisions are
taken by the executive directly outside this system.
Both the budget and ministry policy documents are very detailed and
technocratic.
There are several comprehensive policy plans published for Kenya's ASAL
districts, which identify most of the problems an outsider might list and
which propose various solutions.
Draft policies are not especially sensitive, and are often prepared
with donor (i.e. EU or World Bank) assistance. It is said some policy documents
are written almost entirely by donors.
Background papers are usually prepared by Kenyan consultants, and are
widely available in Nairobi from donors.
There has been more sensitivity in recent years over proposals for privatization
and liberalization, with an open split between the President and donors
and between the President and some members of his own government.
There is generally good agreement what the current policies are supposed
to be, but the details are often not implemented in the ways stipulated.
There structure of the government is outlined in the Nairobi telephone
book, and has also been published in national papers (Cf. Kenya Times,
Feb. 25, 1998).
The budget speech states explicit investment commitments, which, however,
are often either unrealistic or quickly overtaken by events.
Average citizens show considerable sophistication about economic policy
(perhaps more than would be shown in a developed country).
"Promoting and strengthening intersectoral activities"
etc.
If, indeed, the above impressions from mid-1998 are correct, it would
suggest that the donors' preoccupation with policy choice may be
insufficient (see Chapter 10). For Ethiopia, the government is still heavily
engaged in the "institution building" phase necessary to make its federal
system work. It must also cope with a major conflict along its northern
borders. For Kenya, the regime has already developed quite sensible policies
(in this author's view), but needs to discover how to implement these policies
effectively. Nevertheless, let us now summarize each country's main policy
commitments towards the pastoral sector as of mid-1998.
Main Current Policies
Recent policy documents (as of May, 1998) are listed in Appendix 2. For Kenyans, President Moi's own statement (1986) of his policies is important. On issues of structural adjustment, in Ethiopia there are papers from four successive conferences of the Ethiopian Economics Association (see Chapter 3) and for Kenya, three key sources (Aseto & Okelo 1997, Maxon & Ndege 1993, Ndulo & Mwega 1994). In regard to livestock, there are in addition two sources of particular importance, the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture's Conference on Pastoralism in Ethiopia (4-6 February 1993) and Hansen, Woie & Child's (1986) Range Development and Research in Kenya. On food security, see Webb & von Braun (1994) for Ethiopia and Bates (1989:93-146) for Kenya, but be aware both sources are locally controversial.
To sum up these sources augmented by field interviews, a listing of Ethiopia's and Kenya's main current policies is given below.
Ethiopia
1. A fully decentralized, federal system with local assemblies and council
at each level: Woreda, zone and state.
2. National EWS run by DPPC (former RCC). Much local variation with
each NGO running its own FEWS version.
3. Agriculture bureaus are weak, without packages for livestock areas,
and are subservient to political authorities. They have hardly any local
resources (transport, etc.).
The former pastoral extension unit is now located
nationally but has no executive links to the field,
4. The status of marketing infrastructure is in limbo, government has
been giving long-term leases to a Saudi capitalist over former holding
grounds as part of "privatization" policy
5. NGOs are experimenting with paravets selected from the community
and allowed to dispense drugs. Major problems in drug supply continue,
however.
6. Actively seeks to reduce NGOs, insists NGOs must conform to national
plan and focus on capacity-building with phased plan for eventual withdrawal.
7. Revenue generation by annual taxes administered through Peasant Association
(PA). However, amount required is low and does not cover actual service
costs.
Most producers in the field can evade the sales tax
officially required, except it does seem to
8. Pastoral lands are still held by the state, but can be leased by
the state to commercial operators. Considerable uncertainty remains about
what land regulation will be in the future.
Earlier Derg regulations are still in effect.
9. Security remains a sensitive issue, and varies spatially. Government
allows producers to keep arms, which are widespread. Some territory is
still being contested between groups.
10. Privatization is a local issue welcomed with removal of Derg-imposed
controls.
Kenya
1. A District Focus. Launched in 1983, this was significant when funded
by Scandinavians but is now almost defunct.
2. District-based early warning systems, under Office of President,
derived from Turkana and implemented by Dutch DPIRP and by the World Bank's
ALRMP.
3. The MOA has a separate livestock section, and carries on at reduced
scale a set of technical range activities derived from earlier GTZ project
and its district range handbooks.
In recent years, the MOA has added user groups for
water supplies and some adoption of PRA to
4. The status of marketing infrastructure is in limbo, with defunct
holding grounds and stock routes still on the books but not used. Devolution
to local user groups is under active consideration.
5. NGOs experimenting with paravets, roughly the same interventions
as in Ethiopia. Also there is a big issue over how to supervise and use
scheduled drugs.
6. Actively encourages NGOs, many (both international and local) in
field, many also linked to religious groups. NGOs often run experimental
RD programs (Ndegwa 1996).
7. Revenue generation solely by cesses and fees raised by County Council
against commercial activity.
Pastoralists pay no income or land taxes. Large variations
exist in sources of County Council income,
8. Pastoral lands are still held by the state, though some group ranches
are now being sub-divided and individual titles issued. There is much uncertainty
about the future.
Earlier group ranch regulations are still in effect
pending sub-division.
9. Security has become a major issue. Government allows armed units
near borders but not internally. Some territory is still being contested
between groups.
10. Privatization is mainly a national issue.
its future uncertain.
Advice is affected by standard packages for the
extension system, a previous World Bank emphasis
in earlier IRDPs.
work for livestock markets.
delineate local priorities (in districts with donor
projects).
with tourism a major contributor where relevant.
1. There are many similarities between actual situations seen in both
countries. Among the more important we have identified are:
The desire to reform land laws but uncertainty what to do .
The low amount of revenue recaptured by state
The high salience of security matters
The total collapse of IBRD funded stock routes and holding grounds
The large role of famine relief in economy of ASAL districts.
The emergence or expansion of relief-based "towns" in arid areas
Major problems of bush encroachment
Major problems of conflicts spilling over from nearby countries
Major problems posed by "returnees" who have lived abroad
Resort to paravets to compensate for poor veterinary services
As noted in the introduction, these similarities justify having a common
research project looking at prospects for pastoral transformation on both
sides of the Ethiopian/Kenyan border. However, they do also support the
usefulness of sharing policy experience between Ethiopian and Kenyan officials,
perhaps organized through an intermediary international agency like IGADD.
There are so many dimensions to policy choice within the complex pastoral
systems that a division of effort between neighbouring countries makes
good economic sense. (It also explains USAID's attempts to deal with all
the countries in the region through its Greater Horn of Africa Initiative.)
ILRI, with long-standing ties to both Ethiopia and Kenya, and with international
technical staff trained in livestock policy within both countries, is another
obvious resource for national leaders when reviewing their livestock policy
choices. And, of course, it gives added impetus for exchanges at the professional
level between university trainers and between those working in applied
research to assist the pastoralists themselves.
2. There are, however, some important differences:
4. In Ethiopia, support for pastoral aspirations and rights is enshrined
in the new Constitution (reportedly as a counter to the rough-shod treatment
given the Afars in the Awash Valley by previous regimes). Nevertheless,
the long delays in approving draft policies and their descriptive content
suggests that officials are not yet ready to articulate specific policies
(as of early 1998). Operating without policy can leave the field open to
poorly considered initiatives such as spontaneous sedentarization and the
alienation of local resources. (See chapter 7 following.)
5. In the Kenyan case, policy documents give a clear analysis of the
problems of ASAL districts, but then rely on donor projects to carry out
implementation. The disappointing results from successive generations of
donor projects and from Kenya's technocratic, functional approach need
to be recognized (Wiggins 1985). Having policies at a national level is
obviously a first step, but by itself cannot compensate for weaknesses
in implementation and local financing (see chapter 8 following).
Because Ethiopia's regime is both poorly known outside its borders and undergoing very substantial internal changes, we shall address three interrelated topics in this chapter: 1) advantages the current regime enjoys when approaching pastoralists; 2) the emergent structure of Ethiopian administration; and, 3) the dangers of leaving pastoral policies undefined at a time when the country is at war and is making fundamental macro policy changes.
Advantages Ethiopia Enjoys
1. The Constitution itself makes special mention of the rights of pastoral
peoples and the necessity that the State recognizes and protects these
rights (the Afar losses of their lands in the Awash Valley being the source
of this concern). Although already some of these principles are being jeopardized
in the Government's eagerness to promote private, commercial agriculture,
it is a feature which can be emphasized when describing policies for pastoralism.
2. Ethiopia under the Derg devoted a very large share of its resources
to the war with Eritrea. Donors like the World Bank have stressed the great
gains to be made by diverting military expenditure to augmenting Ethiopia's
minuscule social services in places like Borana. Unfortunately, the current
conflict with Eritrea puts in jeopardy this "peace dividend" which was
within reach and which is so greatly needed.
3. The present regime came to power in a wave of popular support which
surprised the Derg's supporters (and many western donors). There is real
advantage to mobilizing popular sentiments when a government acts in accordance
with the people's own desires. In Borana, the desire for peace and for
restoration of civil order seems to have been behind the rapid normalization
after the chaotic circumstances in 1992-93.
4. Ethiopian officials still show a commitment to their duties that
keeps them in post during working hours (unlike officials elsewhere in
Eastern Africa). A strong work ethic and relatively low corruption would
appear to be temporary assets carried over from the previous regime.
5. The present government has articulated a strong interest in local
capacity building. This focus is highly relevant to Ethiopia's future growth,
and takes advantage of the country's pool of human capital. What remains
is perhaps to devise more effective ways to carry this objective out in
actual practice.
6. Probably the most important advantage Ethiopia has (in which regard
it resembles Kenya) is its large pool of high level manpower at a first
degree level. Both Addis Ababa university and Alemaya University of Agriculture
are among the older institutions of their type within East Africa. Ethiopia
today has many senior consultants who formerly worked in public employment
and who know the country intimately. There are also several active professional
associations, which hold annual meetings at which technical papers are
presented. There are also various networks like Penha and local NGOs with
a specific focus on pastoral development.
7. In theory, at least, Ethiopia should have adequate professional resources to undertake fairly major programs oriented towards pastoral development. In practice, there are certain limiting factors: i) an uneven distribution between fields, ii) a concentration of high level staff in Addis Ababa, iii) the huge gap between public or even NGO salaries and private salaries, and, iv) uncertainties about the loyalty of former Derg officials which prevent full use of some senior professionals.
The Emergent Structure of Local Administration
1. Although the present government dates back to 1993, it is best viewed
as a work still in progress. Many basic policies--as, for instance, land
policy for the pastoral areas--remain in limbo, with earlier policies still
in effect but with the possibility they may be changed. Relationships of
national level to state level institutions have not yet been defined in
many cases. There are also differences between northern regions and the
South. Indeed, the Oromia State Government would like to claim Addis Ababa,
the capital city, as part of its region. With such fundamental issues unresolved,
it is premature to describe specific development policies for many seemingly
critical issues.
2. However, a common structural model has emerged. The Prime Minister's
relationship to federal ministries is seen as being directly parallel to
the State Government's relationship to various technical bureaus. Hence
most Ministry of Agriculture functions at the federal level are paralleled
in the Bureau of Agriculture in the Oromia State Government. Other agencies
which in Kenya would be called parastatals are in Ethiopia given the status
of Commissions. These--the example being the Drought Preparedness and Prevention
Commission, or DPPC--will also have a national office and parallel state-government
offices.
3. From interviews and state-level documents, it is clear the state
governments view themselves as semi-sovereign. They deal with donors like
the UNDP directly when presenting plans for funding (at least in the Oromiya
case; one doubts that the smaller states wield similar power). If one takes
the Oromiya government's own views as binding, Ethiopia is more nearly
a confederation (along Swiss lines) that an integrated Federal nation (along
US or Indian lines). The precise division of responsibilities between the
former federal ministries and the emergent state bureaus is currently being
worked out. It constitutes probably the largest arena for policy-making
currently under formation, but because of its highly political nature is
carried out behind closed doors. Once policies have been accepted at the
Cabinet level, they are issued in government proclamations.
4. Given the desire of states to emulate the powers of the national
level, the current stress is upon "institution building" to replicate all
important national institutions within the separate regions. For
Oromiya, with more than 18 million people, this goal is possible. For the
smaller regions, however, it represents an unrealistic and distant target.
The question then becomes: in a very poor nation (currently at war again),
which central institutions will be represented also at the state
level, and in which states will they be actually created? These
issues, which concern infrastructure and investment, take precedence over
the "policy" matters we might otherwise expect to be addressed.
5. Below the State level come the zonal offices--roughly equivalent
to provinces but slightly smaller than Kenya's provinces--and below these
the Woredas (or district administration). The zonal level offices
in Ngelle for the Borena zone are brand new.
6. The Woredas are roughly equivalent to "districts" in East
Africa, but have an elected Woreda Council that meets twice a year. While
the zonal level can approximate the usual line departments found in the
state government, at the Woreda level there are basically three main departments:
a) economic affairs (agriculture, water, urban development & finance);
b) social affairs (education, health, sports, culture & women's affairs);
c) security (police, militia, prisons).
7. The Woredas (also spelled wereda) are staffed mainly
by younger graduates and often do not have yet the minimum administrative
infrastructure we would expect in a district. Some Kenyan Divisions are
about as well equipped as the smaller Ethiopian Woredas. From first
impressions, while the zonal level will gradually become a unit much like
the state, the Woredas are more downwardly oriented to the constituent
Peasant Associations (or Pas). They lack most essentials for effective
administration. Usually, they are located near a security unit.
8. The PA level was a creation of the Derg Regime, and in more northern
regions were the basis of a massive resettlement program. In Borana, however,
PAs appear to have become reasonably well established and did not entail
physical relocation of households. They thus retained more legitimacy than
they would ahve if made the basis for compulsory resettlement. The current
regime has, however, combined some peasant associations to aim for a minimum
population of 5,000 per PA. PAs are thus roughly equivalent to the Location
level (with its Chief) in the Kenya system.
9. As with Woredas, so also each PA has its Assembly and elects
a PA Chairman and Executive Committee (a secretary, member in charge of
development, and 2 other representatives). The two members with the Secretary
form the judiciary of the PA. Indeed, each level from the PA upwards
has its elected assembly--creating a democratic but very cumbersome hierarchy
of elected bodies all the way up to the State level.
10. There are many aspects of this structure which remain unclear to outsiders. Much of it presents a hold-over from the Derg system, and may be subject to further changes as the State (or Region) governments find their modes for administrative action. For the Borana zone (which includes Gujji), a useful report prepared for Norwegian Church Aid in May, 1997 by Helland, Olafsson, Ato Teshome Woldesemayat, and Gufu Oba describes the current system. However, other sources give different versions. The very rapid field visit in March 1998 was insufficient to establish the necessary details. (Dr. Patrick Alila of the IDS Nairobi is, in collaboration with an Ethiopian colleague, preparing a description of Ethiopia and Kenya's current service administration which may clarify the approximate picture presented here.)
To sum up, then, the Ethiopian local administration is paradoxically very impoverished and very complex. There are huge transaction costs in making the present system operate, because of the many levels and the great uncertainty about procedures. (Borana has the added complication of fears over OLF influence.) Local administration will need to be studied as part of USAID's CRSP, but this remains difficult and sensitive research to conduct.
The Dangers of Leaving Pastoral Policies Undefined
1. At the time of the author's visit, Ethiopia's national leadership
had not yet announced the regime's policies towards livestock development
in the pastoral areas. Two key documents were circulating within Addis
Ababa, the country's food security strategy and its ruminant livestock
development strategy (see Appendix 2). In England, the author also gained
access to Ethiopia's environmental strategy paper (again, in draft), and
to the government's policy framework paper prepared for an IMF/World Bank
meeting of December 10-12, 1996. We were told of a government paper on
veterinary services, and of another report in preparation to advise on
technical packages for the dryland areas. In addition, the Oromiya State
Government had prepared its own investment plan for presentation to donors
(also a confidential document awaiting final approval). It seems significant
that as of mid-1998 four of the five key policy documents were still in
draft, although three of them had been submitted more than two years earlier.
A further complication was Ethiopia's on-going negotiations with the African
Development Bank for a new, US $40 million livestock project (designed
jointly with FAO's Investment Center) whose details had not yet been announced
in early 1998.
2. The simplest explanation is that the regime was in 1998 still too preoccupied in establishing itself to spend time on the details of policy formulation. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture's "Ruminant Livestock Development Strategy" mainly describes a list of possible investment projects (usually with accompanying scientific data from old ILCA reports). Hardly any of it deals with controversial issues or choosing between alternative goals. Instead, the document assumes the earlier projects were necessary and desirable, and puts high priority on applied science and commercialized production.
3. But perhaps the lack of stated policies reflects deeper ambiguities.
We must remember that Ethiopia's regime came to power in part because of
the support of the Afar people, who long suffered under the previous regimes'
policies (Derg and pre-Derg alike) which dispossessed them from grazing
lands to create subsidized and inefficient irrigation schemes in the Awash
Valley. The regime wants therefore to avoid dispossessing pastoralists,
but at the same time promotes commercial agriculture and privatization
- two goals likely to have the very impact the regime hopes to avoid.
4. Some senior MOA officials believe sincerely that the sedentarization
of Ethiopia's pastoralists is a precondition for further progress within
the rangelands. We saw in chapter 3 that this was the major goal underlying
the formation of service co-operatives by SORDU during the Derg years.
Indeed, Borana did not receive the full force of compulsory villagization
imposed on Ethiopia's farming communities further north. Many education
Boran were associated in one way or another with the Derg's program for
pastoral sedentarization. This background presents today's regime with
huge complexities affecting recruitment of technical staff, the fate of
the surviving service co-operatives, the role of SORDU itself in supplying
field services, and debates over what type of extension to implement within
rangeland areas. Those Ethiopians who worked within the rangelands often
agree that physical settlement of pastoralists is not desirable, but more
senior MOA officials would like to see privatization and sedentarization
within what had been a "common property" resource.
5. Chapter three also describes the two decades of Ethiopian effort
to develop and promote improved crop packages for the nation's peasant
farmers. These packages required peasants to adopt several interrelated
"high input" innovations simultaneously: modern varieties coupled with
fertilizer and better water management. Many senior MOA officials learned
their craft in this context, which sees hybrid varieties and irrigation
as the keys to achieving high yields and so to better food security. Unfortunately,
however, dryland farming packages are difficult to define, and give poor
results when implemented through standardized recommendations that are
not adjusted to local variations in soils, rainfall, and pest challenge.
In the past, MOA officials ignored these limiting factors and simply adopted
recommendations derived in highland areas with much better soils and rainfall
than the marginal rangelands. Even in early 1998, farmers in Arero and
Yavello were being urged to plant drought resistant maize in places where
rainfall might support millet but where maize will often fail. The weaknesses
of dryland packages can then contribute to rather than relieve food deficits
(especially once the El Niño period of increased rains comes to
an end).
6. Some senior officials thus believe the promotion of small-scale irrigation
will protect pastoral communities from the worst impacts of drought. While
there is much experience with irrigation in pastoral communities from elsewhere
in East Africa (notably in northern Kenya), this is still a new technology
in Ethiopia's Borana. (Most Ehtiopian irrigation occurs farther north in
the Awash Valley.) Unfortunately, experience suggests this may not be an
appropriate answer for Ethiopia's southern rangelands, which mostly lack
large rivers. Irrigation is a heavy user of water, diverting it at points
higher in a drainage and so denying it to pastoralists lower down. Irrigation
also requires stable water supplies - not found in Borana's few and highly
seasonal rivers - and tends to fail in the very years when most is expected
from it. To pay high investment costs, irrigation requires high input farming
(fertilizer, good seeds, insecticides) - the very inputs usually not found
in remote communities. Irrigation requires a highly disciplined labor force
already experienced in intensive farming - something pastoralists cannot
supply if they must also herd animals. Where irrigated farming has been
adopted, it is often by outsiders who have some prior experience with the
technology. And, of course, irrigated production required markets for crops
and effective disease and pest control. For Ethiopia, with a weak extension
service and a shortage of capital, highly technical and capital intensive
irrigation is perhaps the last remedy to consider. Once again, if these
difficulties are not identified and overcome, a blind commitment to irrigation
as a solution to drought will leave pastoral communities even worse off
than if nothing had been done (see Helland 1980, Moris & Thom 1990:
367-394).
7. The present economy of southern Ethiopia has many linkages across
the Kenya and Somali borders. Cross-border trade is unavoidably affected
by existing macroeconomic policies, e.g. exchange rates and controls, import
and export duties, taxation policies, and the like. Often pastoral communities
respond to such instruments differently from residents in the heartland.
A failure to examine the likely responses may encourage smuggling, a loss
of capital when live animals are taken across the border, and various other
unintended impacts. The fact that a joint market already exists means that
we cannot avoid local responses, even when no official policy has been
framed.
8. In regard to land law and other controversial government actions,
if policies are not formulated then the earlier policies of the Derg (and
sometimes even the Imperial Government) will prevail. Sometimes these are
highly inappropriate in today's setting. For example, under Ethiopia's
pre-1974 Imperial regime, the government on occasion allocated certain
resources to nobles for collecting of tribute. Under the Derg, such resources
while still owned and used by pastoral communities were listed as "public."
Now these same resources are being considered for sale or lease under the
government's privatization program, even though peasants continue to use
them locally as they always have. (Here the example refers to craters where
Boran pastoralists collect mineral salts so vital to their animal's health.)
A similar question arises with regard to the privatization of the various
ranches and holding grounds which the Derg regime had developed to serve
Borana. Do Boran benefit more by handing over these defunct facilities
to international capitalists, or should they be returned to their original
owners (who have used them unofficially for the past decade or so)? The
point is simply that such decisions will be taken at the national
level. The only way to insure that local impacts and interests are weighed
is to make policy choice an explicit, open process which actively involves
local stakeholders.
9. Perhaps the largest unresolved issue remains what to do about SORDU,
the parastatal service agency left over from the World Bank years and still
responsible for road maintenance, some veterinary services, and water supply
construction. As of early 1998, SORDU still retained the only nucleus of
technically trained rangeland staff found anywhere within the sourthern
zone. Its staffing and field activities were continuing on a minimum-cost,
skeletal basis pending decisions at the Oromiya State and national levels
about its future. The imminent withdrawal of Care's activities in the South
leaves SORDU in Yavello and the GTZ program in Ngelle as the two main agencies
with effective technical competence in the entire region. Yet neither was
operating within an agreed set of development policies for the pastoral
sector.
10. One sees, then, a cluster of reasons why Ethiopia's senior officials may prefer to leave pastoral policies unstated and perhaps unaddressed. These are:
• Uncertainties about how to formulate policies which cross-cut national, state, and local functions.
• A lack of technical packages which work well in drylands, within an extension system which still relies on technical packages.
• A reluctance to employ Ethiopians who worked on rangeland development as part of the Derg's program.
• A split of opinion at senior levels over the desirability of sedentarization and irrigation for pastoral areas.
• Some distrust of NGOs who have been active within the drier areas in providing famine relief and food-for-work, but who may lack any clear understanding of how to transform relief into development.
• A lack of funds to support development activities which formerly the World Bank financed through SORDU.
• The anamolous situation of SORDU itself, as a large parastatal operating
within very poor and weakly staffed Woredas (districts).
Even so, unexpected events can highlight the dangers of operating for
an extended period without agreed government policies. In May of 1998,
hostilities erupted between Eritrea and Ethiopia. For a poor country like
Ethiopia, a major war along its borders becomes a huge expense which quickly
pre-empts its leaders' attention and the nation's finances. One readily
understands that while a war is underway, there will be no further finance
to support unfunded local activities far from the battlefield. Nor will
leaders have the time to review policy choices within nonstrategic domains.
War also tilts the balance towards strongly centralized decision-making,
further reducing the scope for involving local stakeholders in policy choice.
And, in southern Ethiopia, war can be expected to revive tensions which
the government and the people hoped had begun to die. Worst of all, war
removes the "peace dividend" upon which donors had hoped to build infrastructure
within Ethiopia's very poorest regions: its pastoral lands.
1. As indicated above, Kenyan administration shows great continuity
over time with a focus on orderly, efficient services defined functionally
and integrated at a district level (which is also the apex of Local Government
in the form of the County Council). The District Commissioner's Office
remains the starting point for any field initiatives, once the Office of
the President's backing has been secured (vital in most ASAL districts).
2. With regard to manpower, Kenya has a far better ratio of staff per
rural population than do other African countries. Most districts actually
have District Agricultural Officers, District Livestock Development Officers,
District Veterinary Officers, and even Range Officers in post. Formerly,
these officials had vehicles and resources; today, the Kenyan field offices
are usually ringed with defunct vehicles. The policy issue is, of course,
whether to provide resources to empower this existing establishment once
again - as district officials would prefer - or whether to privatize and
cut back services to commercially sustainable levels, as donors would prefer.
3. Kenya has gone farther (see chapter 3) than almost any other East
African country to implement technical range management, issuing district
range handbooks accompanied by vegetation maps and maintaining field plots
which are assessed to determine range trends. The Kenya MOA has one of
East Africa's oldest Divisions of Range Management, established with UNDP
assistance in 1963. (Kenya began issuing diplomas in Range Management in
1965, at Egerton College.) The UNDP/FAO project (1964-73) also helped establish
a National Range Research station at Kiboko in 1971, and an aerial survey
unit to undertake annual livestock and wildlife counts in the ASAL districts
(formerly KREMU but now become the Department of Resource Surveys and Remote
Sensing, or DRSRS). In northern Kenya, the Germans took over from UNESCO
and the UNDP the main support of technical range management planning by
creating the range handbooks and accompanying district maps within the
MOA's Range Management Division. Considering the remoteness of the areas
so described, we should recognize these as major resources to be updated
and built upon in future work. In Nairobi, the Ministry is digitizing its
range management database for computerized updating, while the DRSRS is
seeking to sell its outputs commercially. All in all, this deep technical
background means that Kenyan officials can draw upon nearly thirty five
years of field experience with applied range management - an almost unparalleled
record in sub-Saharan Africa. (For recent range management information
derived from Marsabit District, see Keya's 1998 dissertation.)
4. Kenya devoted a huge effort to formulating its latest World Bank
project for the dry lands, the World Bank's ALRMP, located in a special
section of the Office of the President, and staffed by technical experts.
It has admirable policy documents analyzing the problems of ASAL areas
at a national level. (Indeed, the mere listing of planning studies and
documents assembled for the joint Bank/GOK ASAL planning team in 1992 ran
to 26 pages!)
5. We should also note that the Bank's ALRMP is simply the latest in
a cluster of similar projects underway in the early 1990s (see chapter
3). There was the European Union's KLDP for approximately ECU 9 million
during the period from 1988 to 1992; the Pastoralist Integrated Development
Project with $630,000 of UNDP funds from 1992-94; the World Bank's own
Emergency Drought Recovery Project with $27 million in 1993-95; the German
financed projects in Samburu and Marsabit; and the bilaterial Kenyan-Netherlands
Drought Preparedness, Intervention and Recovery Programme (DPIRP) which
overlapped the ALRMP in some ASAL districts. And, of course, there is the
substantial NORAD presence in Turkana during the 1980s and the various
NGO activities by Action Aid, Farm Africa, and other, smaller organizations
within the CRSP area. No doubt each of these projects and agencies regards
itself as underfunded and "over challenged" - because it addresses entrenched
problems under difficult circumstances. Overall, however, there appear
to have been enough resources to register a major impact if we assume a
technocratic project approach is what Kenya's ASAL districts require.
And yet -
6. In the field, it is apparent the range section lacks operational
linkages to potential users of its rich data base. The science was effectively
transferred into the field, but linkages to production never occurred.
Now, under budgetary cutbacks, the DRSRS annual surveys have been discontinued
and the aging scientific database exists in a limbo without stimulating
local consumer demand but little used among external scientists. We see,
then, that range science activities were largely driven by top-down expertise
and donor funding.
7. The World Bank's very carefully formulated ALRMP project has also
huge implementation problems even when advocating the very latest participatory
approaches. It may have suffered from an overlap of early warning functions
with the Dutch funded DRIRP (now being wound up), and from tension between
the donor community and the Kenya government. Donors have strongly advocated
downsizing Kenya's public sector, and the privatization of various agricultural
parastatals. In recent years, the Bank and other donors have been involved
in virtually continuous negotiations with the Kenya Government, leading
to numerous temporary delays. Very brief field visits did not permit evaluation
of the ALRMP's important activities which obviously merit further scrutiny
as the ALRMP comes to its maturity.
8. How to engage rural communities actively which are isolated by the
breakdown of security and by destruction of roads under flooding is still
uncertain. We must assume the reduced commercial and tourist activity has
had dramatic impacts on local revenue. For example, Isiolo's District Treasurer
reported that revenue from his district's parks had dropped for K shs 5
million per week to 78,000 per week after some well publicized attacks
on tourists in the vicinity. (90% of Isiolo's County Council revenue comes
from various Park fees.)
9. There is still no effective means to generate revenues at a scale which will make introduced project activities economically sustainable once donor funding comes to an end - as it must, no matter how sympathetic the donor. A major case in point relates to the issue of veterinary privatization for remote pastoral areas. As of mid-1998, Kenya's livestock officials were digesting the proposals of a key EU report, "Improved Delivery of Animal Health Services in Kenya" (draft). This report was specifically directed to address ASAL needs in the animal health field. While not yet officially released in June of 1998, it contains valuable comments derived from field visits to ASAL districts in February-March of 1998 (pp. 60-79). Field interviews with some of the same veterinary staff of briefed the EU mission revealed a deep split in opinions regarding veterinary privatization (see section 4 of chapter 9). Everyone agreed that Kenya's existing privatization measures have been reasonably successful in the country's higher potential areas (see the KVAPS described in chapter 3).
However, in the remote pastoral communities the purpose of animal health
interventions is mainly to protect higher value downcountry producers (now
being served by private vets) from animal diseases. This introduces a large
element of externality into one's calculations of the need for ASAL veterinary
services (see Majok & Schwabe 1996). Furthermore, because access to
drugs and diagnosis is so difficult, veterinary scouts are tempted to sell
diluted supplies while offering inaccurate on-the-spot diagnoses of animal
illness. Some community based animal health assistants have been put into
the field by NGOs with as little as one month's training; and junior animal
health assistants may have only primary school education. One DVO interviewed
was emphatic that in such circumstances, the public veterinarian's supervision
of drug handling and veterinary scout training remains essential, even
as private veterinarians come into local practice. (The EU draft report
lists only 10 private veterinary practices in the whole of Eastern Province,
based on 1995 figures.)
10. The current budgetary crisis in Kenya leaves well trained field
professionals of all types with salaries too low to motivate expected performance.
Field offices lack the resources to allow field travel or replacement of
equipment, unless they have associated technical assistance projects (like
the Dutch DPIRP or the GTZ Marsabit program). Perhaps as a consequence,
one finds many public officials away from their desks for much of each
day (a trait shared these days with much of the rest of Africa, but notably
not true in Ethiopia yet). Thus Kenya's impressive technostructure
(for an African country) is but a hollow shell - offices with staff but
without vehicles or recurrent funds.
11. Finally, emergent corruption (which is fueled by the huge gap between
private and public salaries, as well as election campaigns, privatization,
and other opportunities for rent-seeking) is further destroying morale
while also causing a cut-off of donor funds.
From the field visits done in Southern Ethiopia and Northern Kenya,
based on a very rapid field reconnaissance, there appear to be five
types of field intervention which merit further scrutiny and perhaps assistance:
1. The "District Focus" in Kenya when operational. For a period
Kenya did actually implement parts of its District Focus strategy (announced
in 1983) involving block funds to districts and also the creation of district
information offices. Both remain very attractive concepts. The block funding
gives line departments an incentive to co-operate, and stimulated actual
discussion on local priorities. There are many advantages to a rolling
plan system which lets districts choose their own priorities. The danger,
however, is that such a system is open to corruption if not tightly monitored.
In Kenya's case, the funds came from Scandinavian countries. When funding
was cut off - reportedly because of irregularities - the district planning
offices became a hollow shell, staffed but not financed. Similarly, the
idea that each district should have a place where donor studies are lodged
and where technicians can go for a data base is sound: such offices functioned
for a time in Turkana and Kajiado. Today they, too, exist but have no equipment
for the computer age and no incoming information.
2. User Associations responsible for water supplies. Under UNDP and WB funding, Kenya implemented a "pastoralist integrated development project" (PIDP) which adopted a Water User Association approach to maintenance of water supplies in pastoral communities. Silted up dams and non-operational boreholes have been common in remote pastoral communities. Most earlier projects focused on the physical creation of a supply, and then assumed the Ministry of Water Development would simply step in to maintain the source once constructed.
Both in Kenya and in Ethiopia, by the early 1990s it was obvious that earlier approaches were ineffective. The second generation water projects begun since then involved: a) careful matching of types of supply to local capacities; b) NGOs as facilitating agencies; c) detailed community PRA studies in choosing types of supply and locations; and, d) vesting ownership in local groups once a supply became operational. Usually, too, supplies were constructed under loan financing guaranteed by local leaders and a user group.
There have been some successes - even, it is claimed, a few boreholes still being operated by user groups. However, the program is very ambitious. It assumed groups could be formed and could take over supplies almost immediately. While local people welcomed involvement in decision-making about supplies, the groups formed sometimes lacked permanence or cohesion. When the project terminated, some groups ceased operating and some supplies soon evidence the same problems which earlier projects showed. Some MOALD officials claim that the user associations have been left stranded, without having yet acquired sufficient skills and means to play the role expected of them.
Nevertheless, given the large literature and international experience
with user associations and the great need to create a locally sustainable
system, these groups merit further study and assistance as a matter
of urgency. (Of course, the very high rainfall in 1998 reduced the
water demand in the immediate future.)
3. PRA and Community Mobilization. All the European donors now rely upon locally conducted PRA (participatory rapid appraisal) as their entry point to communities. The GTZ project in Maralal has added "envisioning" as a device to assist people to identify actions within their reach which lead to desirable futures (Lesorogol 1998:14). The problem is that PRA tends to raise people's expectations, and is now becoming associated with the receipt of technical assistance.
Even so, having people at the local level identify their own problems
is a big step forward over earlier and more technocratic approaches to
problem diagnosis. A study of how different projects and different donors
use PRA, the problems so identified, and how to link PRA with locally mobilized
funds could be valuable. It seems the methodology is here to stay, but
we do not yet understand how to link it to sustainable financial mobilization:
the crucial step if people are expected to create their own capital.
4. Locally supported Paravets. Both in Ethiopia and Kenya, projects are now experimenting with paravets who are recruited from local communities, trained, and then who return to communities without receiving central government salaries. The precise job designations vary. Some have been called "veterinary scouts" (thus reviving an old designation used in the Veterinary Dept.), others are called "community-based health assistants" or some similar title. In Kenya, the PARC-VAC program in Turkana makes such staff the centerpiece of its program. GTZ has used it both in Kenya and Ethiopia, as have also Save-the-Children in Ngelle and CARE in Yavello.
There are, however, many complications which require careful analysis
(Majok & Schwabe 1996). The drop-out rate has been high in some programs.
Sometimes the drugs given to paravets have disappeared without payments
into the revolving fund meant to make paravets locally sustainable. There
are questions about underdosing, and the possible build-up of resistant
pathogens as a consequence. What happens if the local economy disintegrates
because of high stock mortality or raiding? And what about a possible integration
of human and livestock health assistants at the contact level (since drugs
are applied across the artificial divide between human and animal users
already)? And how does the illegal trade in drugs across borders affect
such programs?
All in all, this is an attractive but controversial and still experimental
option. It requires careful documentation and would benefit from exchanges
of information between projects.
5. Alternative Approaches to FEWS and Disaster warning. Kenya's Dutch assisted DPIRP project which was linked to the District Drought Management officers under the Office of the President comes to an end in 1999. The planned creation of a national system had not yet taken place in 1998. Nevertheless, the issue of how to best safeguard food security in ASAL districts remains a high priority in both Kenya and Ethiopia.
A key aspect of this from a policy perspective is how to best link the macro-initiatives, such as the EU and USAID supported FEWS, and the local needs assessment (as represented by DPIRP). Shortages of vegetation and rainfall - which can be monitored technologically by remote sensing - are not the only causes of local disasters. Disease outbreaks and raiding are also a major cause of local stress, as can be adverse terms-of-trade and other stressors. Earlier academic analysis (a comparative study by Buchannan-Smith and Davies) suggest that the linkage of warning to response is the hardest to establish institutionally. In 1993, warning systems worked but the political response was deficient. Then, too, there is the issue of how to deal with excess rain - the 1997 El Niño problem - and how to structure responses to facilitate rehabilitation and development in the subsequent period.
Several of us have been impressed by the existing system being implemented
at the district and community levels in Kenya. The policy is of great importance,
even if the future of the DPIRP initiative is at this writing uncertain.
The World Bank's ALRMP program is also a key player, and will probably
inherit DPIRP's mandate when Dutch assistance terminates.
Major Unresolved Policy Issues
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
1. Basis for food security. The regime is relying on dry-land packages,
and increased irrigation. Probably neither will suffice. Meanwhile food-relief
dependent agro-pastoral communities are growing rapidly. Given the large
numbers and the poverty of Ethiopia generally, food security remains the
number one unresolved issue.
1. Security of land claims as communities become more heavily armed
is Kenya's greatest as yet unaddressed issue.
2. Resource degradation caused by shrinking pastoral resource base and
rising populations. Bush encroachment is one obvious symptom of the emerging
problem.
2. Security of people and property so that normal commerce can be conducted
must also be restored. This affects not only residents but also tourism,
one of Kenya's most important sources of revenue.
3. How to maintain and extend peace in areas where ethnic groups still
contend for shrinking resources. In particular, the eastern and western
margins of Borana are still contested. A start has been made within Borana
- quite remarkable, considering how armed the populace are -but there is
much more to do.
3. Rehabilitation of the infrastructure at a time of stringent budget
cuts.
4. How to restore some degree of salary parity between public and private
sectors remains crucial. The present imbalance is, instead, widening. It
leads to many unanticipated consequences. The present flight of professional
staff into international NGO employment is unsustainable over the long
run.
4. What form education should take in pastoral communities, a) to yield
locally supported employment, b) to avoid loss of labor to herds, c) to
give relevant learning.
5. How to pay for and then gain greater participation in schooling from
among the pastoral population.
5. How to limit and redress the environmental degradation around emergent,
food-relief dependent settlements (e.g. Korr).
6. Achieving a better balance between Ethiopia's North and South, and
between Addis Ababa and distant rural hinter-lands. At present, the spontaneous
flow of wealth, investment, and brainpower is increasingly into the Addis
Ababa area.
6. How to discourage incoming immigration of the poor from over-crowded
higher potential areas once peace returns (currently less of a problem!).
Here the examples of Kajiado and Moyale (Ethiopia) serve as a warning of
what may be coming.
7. What means for revenue generation can be adopted which will be a)
equitable, b) effective, and c) not distorting to commercial activity.
At present, the system cannot pay for even the existing low level of services.
7. Achieving effective political empowerment for residents of ASAL districts.
8. What strategies to adopt for the pastoral areas, which remain Ethiopia's
poorest and ones whose needs have not been addressed realistically.
8. Ways to protect the wildlife resources in ASAL districts as human
and stock densities rise.
9. Ways to reduce corruption even as privatization opens new opportunities
for the powerful to benefit. This is in turn vital to the restoration of
political legitimacy. The widening salary disparities between public and
private employment will act as an incentive for increased corruption.
10. Ways to bring public and private wages into some degree of parity.
11. What to base revenue generation upon (see item 7 opposite).
Some Implications
Let us now summarize this report's policy findings.
1. Both Ethiopia and Kenya have major unresolved policy issues affecting
pastoralism which are not being addressed locally. These are obvious areas
where government would be expected to act or at least to have contingency
plans. Furthermore, the same issues are salient to both countries.
However, the local priority changes from season to season and area to area.
Any policy success ought to be widely applicable in both countries because
of the underlying similarities, even if particular needs vary at any one
point in time.
2. In both southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya, local policy successes
depend heavily upon the regime's maintenance of peace and security. For
pastoral producers and the entrepreneurs who serve them, periods of insecurity
are as threatening as are natural disasters like droughts or floods. Indeed,
the negative impacts of natural disasters are compounded when they overlap
with times of insecurity (as they have in both countries in recent decades).
Two implications follow. First, the occasional periods of peace (like early
1998) should be seized as windows of opportunity when external assistance
becomes feasible. Second, finding ways to maintain and extend periods of
peace should be each regime's top priority, given that almost all other
initiatives to assist pastoralists depend upon adequate security as a precondition.
Even so, as we have noted, outsiders must recognize that within these countries
matters of internal security are treated as the regime's responsibility,
and are not a domain where outside analysis, negotiation, or advice is
welcomed.
3. Ethiopia's poverty-stricken regime is a proud one conscious of its
need to do something for Regions 4 and 5. The response is to focus on increasing
the physical infrastructure and institutions serving these areas. Hence
the new offices in Ngelle and the commitment to a research ranch near Yavello
run by the Oromiya state government. We have seen, then, that policy choice
as such takes a back seat to institution-building and capacity creation,
the government's announced priority.
4. Kenya's government has chosen to recognize ASAL districts in sweeping
national policy statements, which have then been used with some success
to recruit donor funding (mainly at present the EU support for KARI, GTZ's
field programs, and the World Bank's ALRMP). However, actual on-the-ground
implementation has been far less than one would expect from a reading of
the national documents. Furthermore, the present insecurities greatly limit
the Kenya Government's field activities.
5. The virtual disappearance of infrastructure - especially roads and
bridges - at a time when the government must reduce expenditure is potentially
very serious for Kenya. Similarly, the main trunk road to Ngelle in Ethiopia
still awaits rehabilitation. In terms of transport, much of the ASAL region
is retrogressing rather than improving - a trend with serious implications
for livestock marketing and hence for banking services.
6. Neither Ethiopia nor Kenya have devised an effective taxation base
to support improved rural services. Any such service improvement being
done is under loan financing, which cannot be repaid and which will make
the future even more difficult. Furthermore, it is this structural situation
-- the failure to capture revenues for needed services -- that renders
African regimes so vulnerable to donors' pressures.
7. Both Kenya and Ethiopia have relied upon soft loans from the World
Bank, IDA, and multilateral sources for their grandiose past livestock
development projects. The facilities constructed at great expense and now
being repaid had no local impact, and lie unused and inoperable. ASAL regions
in both countries have in the past absorbed much investment with no positive
effect. One goal for new research should be to document long-term trends,
and to analyze lessons learned from past policy failures.
8. The sheer scale and multiple interactions between unaddressed policy
needs when seen against an extremely poor local economy and deteriorated
infrastructure militate against rational planning and policy choice. Probably
this underlying hopelessness explains Ethiopia's unwillingness to express
its policies and Kenya's elaboration of impressive but not implemented
policies. In the last analysis, neither country has effective answers for
its ASAL districts at the present point in time. National pride keeps officials
from acknowledging this obvious point.
9. Thus, attempts by donors to use policy analysis as a device to force these regimes to become more "rational" and to deal with obvious constraints are futile. The avoidance of technocratic policy analysis by government officials is, I suggest, deliberate and for sound rational reasons. In Ethiopia, as we have seen, it occurs because the regime does not solicit outside advice when framing its policy choices, and because currently the Oromia state government is heavily engaged in institution building and infrastructural creation. In Kenya, it occurs because in ASAL districts the government has only a weak capacity to carry out nationally dictated policies, and because key changes threaten the patronage base the regime needs to remain popular with diverse ethnic constituencies. There is, furthermore, the contradiction that in the short run the costs of policy change especially affect poor producers in the most marginal areas--the very constituents who have been the current regime's strongest supporters.
10. In general, our review here of the changing policy environments for East African pastoralists has highlighted the limits of policy analysis as donors' main input into African development. Quite plainly, policy analysis alone is not sufficient to bring about the changes desired. We can summarize the findings of this paper by listing five reasons why this is so:
Exchange rates, controls
Taxation instruments/policy
Duties, cesses, etc. where collected, if evaded, etc.
Liberalization of trade, trade policies
Credit and finance policies
Food policies
Disaster relief system (if any)
Monitoring devices
Linkages of warning to response: how achieved?
Form of assistance in the field
Deconcentration/decentralization of government revenues
Export crops and how handled and taxed
Livestock: how traded and taxed
User charges for services
Existing subsidies, micro and macro effects
Education: use, effectiveness, cost recovery
Health, human and animal: effectiveness, cost recovery
Public, parastatal or private?
Self-financed services?
Privatization initiatives (esp. for veterinary, water supplies, trade)
Externalities, degree provision can be limited to users (and so charged)
Different types for commercial vs "traditional" citizens
Privatization, sub-division, etc.
Property rights regimes
Whether used as collateral
Dispute resolution and transaction costs
Protection of wildlife, effectiveness
Watershed conservation measures
Forest reserves, agro-forestry
Energy policy, question of charcoal trade
Whether wildlife reserves pay to local stakeholders
Effective mobilization of talent?
Educational and training policies
Population policies
Aids measures
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1. This section summarized a longer paper by the author, "The Changing Policy Environments for Pastoralists in Northern Kenya, 1963-1998." It also draws upon the author's personal experience in Kenya from 1965 onwards.